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But nature is a stranger yet,
The ones that cite her most
Have never passed her haunted house,
Nor simplified her ghost.
To pity those that know her not
Is helped by the regret
That those who know her, know her less








Peter Unger's puzzle, the problem of the many, is an argument for the conclusion
that we are grossly mistaken about what kinds of objects are in our immediate
surroundings. But it is not clear what we should make of Unger's argument. There
is an epistemic view which says that the argument shows that we don't know which
objects are the referents of singular terms in our language. There is a linguistic view
which says that Unger's puzzle shows that ordinary singular terms and count nouns
are vague. Finally, there is an ontological view which says that the puzzle shows
that there are vague objects.
The epistemic view offers the simplest solution to the problem of the many,
but runs foul of a different problem, the problem of vague reference. The problem
of vague reference is that given the presuppositions of the epistemic view there are
too many too similar objects that might be the reference of a name such as
'Kilimanjaro' for it to be plausible that the name has a determinate reference. The
linguistic view, spelled out in terms of semantic indecision and supervaluation,
offers the same solution to the problem of the many and to the problem of vague
reference. But it leaves no room for de re beliefs about ordinary material object. The
ontological view offers a solution to the problem of the many that avoids the
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problem of vague reference and the problem of de re beliefs. For these reasons it is
preferable to the other two.
However, ontological vagueness has met strong objections. It has been argued
that it is a fallacy of verbalism, that it is inconsistent and that once formulated in a
consistent way it is not distinguishable from the linguistic view. These objections
can be nlet, but not without cost. To avoid the charge of being inconsistent, friends
of the ontological view have to give up the law of excluded middle.
A positive account of vague parthood has two parts. First, parthood is not
primitive but dependent on other primitive facts. The most important of the
primitive facts are facts about to what kinds objects belong and how objects are
causally related. Second, sometimes the primitive facts fail do determine of two
objects whether one is part of the other. Given a notion of vague parthood, a notion
of vague object can be defined roughly in the following way: An object 0 is vague iff
there is an object a such that it is indeterminate whether a is part of 0.
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Vagueness comes into philosophy as a problem maker. We have our theories of
what exists, how language has meaning and what we can know and believe, and
then someone suggests that if we look closer we will see that there are no ordinary
material objects, we never refer to anything, and we never believe anything of any
particular object. The suggestion is incredible, but many philosophers have argued
that we have no alternative short of accepting it. But they are mistaken, or so I
argue. There are ordinary material objects, but they are vague, we can refer to them
with ordinary names such as 'Kilimanjaro' and 'Toni Morrison' and we can believe
all sorts of things about them, for instance, about Kilimanjaro that it is the tallest
mountain in Africa and about Toni Morrison that she is a pretty good writer. But
what does it mean to say that there are vague objects? The present essay is an
attempt to give a detailed answer to this question.
There are at least two problem of vagueness that go all the way back to
antiquity: the sorites paradox and The Ship of Theseus. The story has it that
Eubulides of Miletus is the author of the sorites paradox, as well as several other
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paradoxes, but we don't know much more about him although he is reported to
have been famous enough to be commented on by a comic poet, important enough
to have carried on a controversy with Aristotle, and clever enough to have gotten
the better of Aristotle in their exchange. We don't know what the controversy was
about, although one speculation has it that Eubulides used a sorites like reasoning to
challenge Aristotle's definition of a virtue as the mean between two extremes. 1
The word 'sorites' comes from the Greek word 'caopos' which means heap and
the original sorites paradox calls into question the division of objects that satisfy the
predicate 'heap' and those that do not satisfy it. The paradox is simple. We
convince ourselves that the following thesis is true: Never does a single grain of
wheat turn something that is not a heap into a heap. This is called the sorites
premiss. From the sorites premiss and the premiss that a single grain of wheat does
not make a heap, it follows that if we start with a single grain of wheat and then add
one at a time, we will never get a heap. And that does not seem right. As a
conclusion about heaps this is not disturbing, but similar reasoning can be repeated
with many predicates in our language, and that makes the paradox more serious.
The sorites paradox shows that our predicates have borderline cases of
application. There are clear cases of objects that satisfy predicates such as 'heap' or
'bald', and there are clear cases of objects that do not satisfy them, and then there are
the borderline cases, objects that fall in-between. There is a contemporary problem
of 'vagueness that is related to the sorites paradox but differs from it in important
ways. We might call this new problem 'the problem of vague objects', and it is this
I See Jon Moline, "Aristotle, Eubulides and the Sorites", Mind, Vol. 78, No. 311 1969.
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problem that is the focus of the present essay. The two problems are similar in
many respects; just as Tom is a borderline case of a bald man, so is Sparky a
borderline case of a pebble that is part of Kilimanjaro, and as a result, competent
speakers aware of all available evidence, are unwilling to classify the sentences
(1) Tom is bald,
(2) Sparky is part of Kilimanjaro,
as either true or false. These sentences are vague or indeterminate as I shall also say.
In the case of (1) we can explain the vagueness by reference to semantic indecision.
This is a linguistic view. We say that the facts that determine meaning are facts
about thoughts and practices of speakers, and these facts just don't fix whether Tom
is in the extension of 'bald'. If we help ourselves to supervaluation as our theory of
truth then we have a solution to the problem of vague predicates and we won't even
have to give up classical logic.
When it comes to sentence (2) we might consider two alternative explanations
of why it is vague. We might say that Kilimanjaro, the mountain itself, is vague, or
we might say that the name 'Kilimanjaro' is vague. The latter explanation, that the
name 'Kilimanjaro' is vague, is similar to the above explanation of the vagueness of
(1); the thoughts and practices of the speakers do not determine whether the name
'Kilimanjaro' refers to a landmass of which Sparky is a part or to some other
landmass of which Sparky is not a part. But the predicate 'bald' and the name
'Kilimanjaro' are not quite on a par when it comes to vagueness. There are at least
two differences that are worth mentioning. First, there is a difference in how we
might resolve issues of vagueness. In the case of the predicates 'bald' or 'heap' we
might resort to an arbitrary stipulation, we can stipulate that fewer than n hairs
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make for a bald head and that it takes at least k grains to make a heap, where n and k
are somewhat arbitrarily chosen natural numbers. We might add some clauses
about the distribution of the hairs and the arrangement of the grains, but, in
principle at least, this should be possible. When it comes to singular terms or count
nouns things are different. It is hard to imagine a similar stipulation in the case of
the name 'Kilimanjaro' for the stipulation would not only need to say which pebbles
are parts of the mountain, but also which pebbles would be parts of it under various
counterfactual circumstances. The problem is clearer if we consider the general term
'mountain' instead of the name 'Kilimanjaro', or if we consider count nouns such as
'chair' and 'table'. It is impossible to formulate any convention, no matter how
arbitrary, that will decide for all chairs, whether such and such a molecule is part of
a chair or not. 2
The second difference is that while there are men of which it is determinate
that they satisfy the predicate 'bald' and others that determinately do not satisfy the
predicate, according to the linguistic view there are no objects that are determinately
the reference of the name 'Kilimanjaro', although there are many objects that are
determinately not the reference of the name. This may not be intolerable as a
conclusion about mountains, but since any ordinary material object will have a
borderline part, reference to ordinary material objects will never be determinate. A
description such as 'The present pope', a demonstrative such as 'That thing over
2 This difference was noted by Quine in his paper "What price bivalence?". Quine says:
"We were able to stipulate an arbitrary minimum to the number of grains in a heap, and a
maximum to the number of hairs on a bald head, but we are at loss to frame a convention for
the molecular demarcation of the surface of a table. Words fail us." ("What price bivalence?",
Theories and Things, Harvard University Press 1981, pp. 34-35).
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there', a proper name such as 'Toni Morrison' and a pronoun such as 'I', will all be
vague in this respect. We might be able to live with this as a conclusion about
language, but the same kind of reasoning that shows that we are unable to single
particular objects out as the referents of singular terms also shows that we are
unable to have de re beliefs about ordinary material objects. We can not even have de
re beliefs about ourselves. And that I find worrisome.
Alternatively, we might explain the vagueness of (2)
(2) Sparky is part of Kilimanjaro,
by saying that the mountain itself is vague. This may seem appealing in many
ways; an object such as Kilimanjaro does, intuitively, not have a precise boundary
and if there are vague objects then reference to ordinary material objects can be
determinate and we can have de re beliefs about them. But the idea that there are
vague objects has been found very perplexing. I believe, however, that this is
mainly because the idea has taken on perplexing forms, not because it need be
perplexing.
The view that there are vague objects is usually formulated in one of three
ways. First, in terms of there being borderline parts or there being no fact of the
matter about something. Here is an example.
... I shall classify a concrete object o as vague (in the ordinary sense in which
Everest is vague) if, and only if, (a) o has borderline spatio-temporal parts and (b)
there is no determinate fact of the matter about whether there are objects that are
neither parts, borderline parts, nor non-parts of o.3
3 Michael Tye, "Vague objects", Mind, Vol. 99, No. 396, 1990, pp. 535-536.
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What we have here is a definition of 'vague object' in terms of borderline parts and
there being no fact of the matter about something. But how are we to understand
the expressions 'is a borderline part' or 'there is not fact of the matter'? If we explain
why there is no fact of the matter why, say, a is part of b in terms of semantic
indecision then what was meant to be a definition of ontological vagueness ends up
being a definition of linguistic vagueness. What is lacking is an explanation of why
there is no fact of the matter about something that is distinctively ontological.
The second way in which the ontological view has been formulated is in terms
of vague identity. Insofar as I can make sense of the idea that identity might be
vague it is not helpful in explaining the vagueness of a sentence such as
(2) Sparky is part of Kilimanjaro.
The idea that identity is vague is better seen as a response to the Ship of Theseus.
This is how Plutarch of Chaeronea described it around the turn of the second
century A.D.
The ship in which Theseus and the youth of Athens returned had thirty oars, and
was preserved by the Athenians down even to the time of Demetrius of Phalerus,
for they took away the old planks as they decayed, putting in new and stronger
timber in their place insomuch that this ship became a standing example among
the philosophers, for the logical question of things that grow; one side holding that
the ship remained the same, and the other contending that it was not the same. 4
If someone pointed to the ship at the time of Theseus' travel and gave it the name 'T'
and then, some years later, pointed at the ship that was being preserved in the dock
in Athens and gave it the name 'D', then it seems unclear whether T = D. Although
4 "Theseus", Plutarch's Lives, .Vol. 1 p. 15.
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the idea that identity is vague may seem initially plausible in the light of The Ship of
Theseus, I don't think it withstands scrutiny. 5 But, be that as it may, my concern is
not the Ship of Theseus but the indeterminacy of sentences such as (2) above. And if
it is the indeterminacy of such sentences that we want to explain then what is at
stake is parthood rather than identity.
The third way in which the ontological view has been formulated is in terms
of fuzzy objects. Friends of fuzzy objects are right in focusing on the notion of
parthood given that it is the indeterminacy of sentences such as (2) above that we
want to explain. The theory of fuzzy objects is an adaptation of the theory of fuzzy
sets to account for borderline cases of material objects. In the theory of fuzzy sets
membership comes in degrees. Similarly, in the theory of fuzzy objects, parthood
comes in degrees. Sparky, for instance, might be part of Kilimanjaro to a degree
0.7438. But fuzzy objects are not vague objects, they are precise objects with a
strange feature, namely that there are entities that are parts of them to a degree.
Consider for instance the following analogy. Suppose we have been assigning
grades on a pass/fail basis, but then change to a scale from 0 to 10 where 0 stands
for no comprehension and 10 stands for perfect comprehension. To assign grades
on such a scale may describe the abilities of students better than the simple pass/fail
classification, but it does not bring in vagueness in any way. Similarly, one can
argue that having parthood come in degrees rather than being a matter of all-or-
nothing allows us to give a more truthful description of the world, but it is not to
bring in vagueness in any way.
5 See for instance Timothy Williamsson, "Identity, vagueness and Leibniz's Law",
unpublished.
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We have briefly seen three formulations of the view that there are vague
objects. In the first formulation the view is not clearly distinguished from the
linguistic view, the second formulation seems to be directed at a different problem
than the one we are concerned with, and in the third formulation what we get is not
a thesis about vague objects at all. This situation is rather perplexing. On the one
hand, we have philosophers arguing for the view that there are vague objects and
against alternative views, but on the other hand, no one seems to be able to
formulate the preferred view in a clear and plausible way. But the situation need
not be this perplexing. The present proposal is a combination of two theses: (i) an
object is vague if and only if it is indeterminate whether another object is part of it
and (ii) we can quantify into indeterminately contexts. The first locates the
vaguleness in the parthood relation, the latter marks the vagueness as ontological
rather than linguistic.
The present essay is an attempt to develop this proposal in some detail and to
answer some criticisms. In Chapter Two I explain how vague parthood allows us to
solve the problem of the many, and in Chapter Three I answer some criticism that
ontological vagueness has met. Chapters Four and Five then develop the view in
more detail by giving an account of the notions of parthood, vague object and
material constitution. Finally, in Chapter Six, I consider the logical properties of a
language with a relation term, 'part of' that stands for a vague relation and singular
terms referring to vague objects.
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Vagueness and The Problem of the Many
In his paper "The problem of the many"6 Peter Unger gives an argument for the
conclusion that we are grossly mistaken about what kinds of objects are in our
immediate surroundings. But it is not clear what we should make of Unger's
argument. Some say it shows something about our knowledge of the external world,
namely that we don't know which objects are the referents of singular terms in our
language. This is the epistemic view. Others say it shows something about
language, namely that the singular terms that we use to refer to ordinary material
objects are vague. This is the linguistic view. Finally, there are those who say that
Unger's argument shows something about the nature of material objects, in particular
that it is a reductio of the premiss that objects must be precise. This I call the
ontological view, and it is this view that I will favor.
6 Peter Unger, "The problem of the many", Midwzest Stldies in Philosophy, Vol. 5 1980.
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1. The problem of the many
1. Before I turn to solutions to the problem I give a reconstruction of Unger's
argument that is more explicit about certain formal features of the argument than
Unger's original formulation. Unger's argument is a reductio argument, it begins
with the supposition that there is a single cloud in the sky and then concludes that
there must either be a host of clouds there or none. As a conclusion about clouds
this is not very troubling, but it should be clear that the same kind of argument can
be repeated for almost any ordinary material object, whether it is a mountain or a
person or what have you.
Unger's argument is not only a reductio argument, it is also what I will call 'an
indifference argument' since a crucial step in the argument turns on two or more
objects being indifferent in a special way. 7 We begin with the supposition that there
is a single cloud in the otherwise blue sky. and the following thesis about clouds.
Cloud Thesis: A cloud is an aggregate of droplets distributed in a suitable
way.8
There are two worries that one might have about Cloud Thesis. The first concerns
the notion of aggregation that figures in it, the second is that we should not say that
clouds are identical to aggregates of droplets but only constituted by such
aggregates at any time. At this point we shall not worry about the notion of
aggregation that figures in Cloud Thesis. When Unger introduced the problem and
7 My treatment of Unger's argument as an indifference argument draws on a discussion by
Stephen Makin in his Indifference Argumnents (Blackwell 1993).
8 What 'in a suitable way' means here is just that the droplets are distributed so as to form a
cloud; we could say that they are cloudishly arranged.
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coined the phrase 'the problem of the many' he did not offer much in a way of
explanation of the relation between droplets and clouds. What he says is that
... the only likely candidates [for being a cloud] will be concrete complexes
composed, at least in the main, not merely of somrre water droplets but of a great
many droplets that are "suitably grouped together".9
And this seems fair enough. The second worry can also be postponed since the
difference between identity and constitution will not be relevant in the first run of
the problem. We shall come back to the notion of aggregation and constitution, but
for now I shall follow Unger and not worry about what these come to in the end.'0
Consider now two different aggregates, Al and A2, that are identified by their
constituent droplets and whose sole difference lies in the presence of one particular
droplet in Al and its absence from A2. Then the difference between Al and A2 is so
minute that there should be no reason why Al is a cloud rather than A2, or vice
versa. I shall say that Al and A2 are indifference candidates, because they are
candidates for being the cloud and it is a matter of indifference which one is the
cloud. Now, if Al is a cloud, then it must also be the cloud in the sky, since we are
assuming that there is only one cloud there, and similarly for A2. Let p be the
proposition that Al is the cloud and q be the proposition that A2 is the cloud. Then
there is no reason why p should be true rather than q, or vice versa. It is a matter of
9 "The problem of the many", p. 415.
10 If we say that clouds are constituted by such aggregates then the many, which will turn
out to be the problematic ones, will not be clouds but constituters of clouds. Instead of there
being too many candidates for being the cloud in the sky, there will be too many candidates
for constituting the cloud in the sky. This conclusion is, however, problematic only if we
assume that the constitution relation is one-one. I say more about this when I get to the
ontological view later in this chapter and when I discuss material constitution in Chapter
Five.
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indifference which of p and q is true, or as I shall also say, p and q are indifferent.
This gives us what I call Indifference Premiss.
Indifference Premiss: p and q are both plausible but indifferent.
What is the notion of indifference that we have here? Let's start by looking at what
Peter Unger says where he is introducing the problem of the many.
... it seems clear that no matter which relevant concrete complex is deemed fit for
cloudhood, that is, is deemed a cloud, there will be very many others each of
which has, in any relevant respect, a claim that is just as good.11
When Unger says that there are many candidates that have just as good a claim for
being a cloud, he is not just saying that there are many candidates about which we
have equally good reasons to assert, say, belief or judge that it is a cloud. He wants
to say something stronger: for any reason for one aggregate of droplets being a
cloud, there is an equally good reason for other aggregates' being a cloud. What I
shall mean by 'indifferent' is then the following:
p and q are indifferent iff for any non-question begging reason for one's being
true there is an equally good reason for the other's being true.
It may be difficult to say exactly what a non-question begging reason is but some
examples may help. A typical question begging reason is the proposition that p is
true, whereas a non-question begging reason is, for instance, a proposition about the
distribution of droplets in the sky, or some general proposition about the natures of
clouds, or the conjunction of some such propositions.
11 "The problem of the many", p. 415.
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From the Indifference Premiss, understood in this way, it is tempting to
conclude that either both p and q are true or neither is, which would suggest the
following thesis:
Duplication Thesis: If p and q are indifferent then either both are true
or neither is.
The Duplication Thesis is in fact a consequence of the indifference of p and q and the
principle of sufficient reason. According to the principle of sufficient reason, if p
and q have a different status, then there must not only be a reason why their status is
different but a sufficient reason. But the Indifference Premiss, as I am suggesting it
should be understood, says that there is no such reason. Hence, p and q must have
the same status.
Even in the absence of the principle of sufficient reason we might want to
accept Duplication Thesis on the grounds of the indifference of p and q. IWe might
find it counterintuitive that complexes such as Al and A2 that differed so minutely
with respect to their constituent matter differed so greatly with respect to
cloudhood. Still, it should be born in mind that the mere indifference does not
commit us to the Duplication Thesis.
From the Indifference Premiss and the Duplication Thesis, along with the
following principle about truth:
p says that S ~ (p is true -- S)
p says that S ~ (p is false <-4 not S)12
we get the following conclusion:
12 It is necessary to have ' ' rather than '--' since if there is a vague term in p the proposition
that p says that S might lack a truth value.
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Either both Al and A2 are clouds or neither is.
Since we are assuming that there is exactly one cloud in the sky it must be that
neither Al nor A2 is the cloud. This alone is not alarming, but since Al and A2 are
as good candidates as any for being a cloud, by parity of reasoning we can
generalize the above conclusion.
Conclusion: Either there is a host of clouds in the sky or none.
And since we want to say that there is exactly one cloud in the sky, this conclusion is
unacceptable. Something must give.
2. Two solutions
1. Philosophers have offered three kinds of solution to this problem: epistemic,
linguistic and ontological. The epistemic solution is in many respects the simplest
one. On this view all that the argument shows is that we don't know where the
boundaries of the cloud are and, therefore, don't know which aggregate of droplets
is the cloud. Friends of the epistemic view insist that insofar as
Indifference Premiss: p and q are both plausible but indifferent,
is a plausible premiss, the notion of indifference must be epistemic, i.e. the
Indifference Premiss should read along the following lines:
Epistemic Indifference: p and q are both plausible but there is no reason to
assert (say, judge, believe, ...) that p is true rather than to assert (say, judge,
believe, ...) that q is true.
If the Indifference Premiss is read along the lines of Epistemic Indifference, then the
Duplication Thesis has no force ai,d Unger's argument is not compelling. Two
propositions can obviously have equal epistemic status and yet one be true and the
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other false; if the police can't tell of two suspects which one is guilty it does not
follow that both suspects are guilty or neither is. And similarly, if we can't find a
reason why one aggregate of droplets should be a cloud rather than some other, it
does not follow that either both are clouds or neither is.
According to the epistemic view all that the problem of the many shows is that
we use certain singular terms and count nouns in our language despite ignorance
about their reference and extension. And this is not an alarming conclusion.
Moreover, since the candidates among which we are too ignorant to choose are
indifferent in an important respect, one might suggest that this ignorance is, after all,
harmless.
But even if the epistemic view offers a solution to the problem of the many, a
different problem will make trouble for it. This new problem is not an ontological
problem but a problem about language, I call it 'the problem of vague reference'.
2. According to the epistemic view a name such as 'Kilimanjaro' refers
determinately to some object - there is a fact of the matter about what it refers to -
we just don't know which object it is. Now, suppose a skeptic comes along who
challenges the claim that the name 'Kilimanjaro' has a determinate reference. First,
the skeptic suggests two different candidates for being the mountain, say K1 and K2.
These candidates are aggregates of gravel and soil, and they seem to be just as good
a candidate for being Kilimanjaro as any other aggregate. Moreover, these two
candidates differ only minutely; let's say that the only difference is a single pebble,
call it 'Sparky', that belongs to one but not the other. Second, the skeptic suggests
the following thesis about reference:
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Reference Thesis: A name n in a language L refers to e if and only if the
thoughts and practices of the speakers of L determine that n refers to e.
Now, the skeptic challenges us to explain what fact about our thoughts and
practices, however broadly construed, could determine that the name 'Kilimanjaro'
referred to K1 rather than K2. And there just does not seem to be any such fact. The
problem is generated by the combination of three theses, (i) that there are
indifference candidates such as K1 and K2, (ii) that an ordinary name such as
'Kilimanjaro' has determined reference and (iii) that what determines reference are
thoughts and practices of speakers.
I should stress that this problem is not a problem for formal semantics, i.e. we
can, for instance, still give a Tarski style definition of truth where we have clauses
such as:
if x - 'Kilimanjaro' then x refers to Kilimanjaro,
for all the singular terms and clauses such as:
if x = 'mountain' then x refers to mountains,
for all the count nouns in the language. But, unless we can solve the problem of
vague reference we can't hope to use the notion of reference as a basis for serious
attempt to understand linguistic behavior. Consider, for instance, the following
passage from the opening of Strawson's Individuals.
Very often, when two people are talking, one of them, the speaker, refers to or
mentions some particular or other. Very often, the other, the hearer, knows what,
or which, particular the speaker is talking about; but sometimes he does not. 13
13 Peter F. Strawson, Individuals: An Essay in Descriptive Metrtpiysics, Methuen & Co. Ltd.,
1959, pp. 15-16.
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If the notion of reference is to serve in an account of communication, we should say
that when the hearer does not know which individual the speaker refers to or when
the hearer identifies a different individual from the one intended by the speaker,
then communication is defective; we have a case of mis-communication or even lack
of communication.
Now, suppose mountains are aggregates of clods of earth and that on some
beautiful day down in Tanzania I point to where the land rises and say "That is
Kilimanjaro". Since at the same location there are so many aggregates of clods of
earth that differ only minutely I have no means of identifying one as opposed to
some other complex as the bearer of the name 'Kilimanjaro', i.e. I can't have
mentioned any particular object. And even if I could identify one aggregate, it is
unlikely that my interlocutor would single out the same aggregate as the referent of
the name. The same goes for our talk about other ordinary material objects, clouds,
people, etc. If reference is central to communication, then almost all communication
will turn out to be defective.
3. What the skeptic has done is to follow up on the epistemic solution to the
problem of the many with a different indifference argument. This new indifference
argument is not about clouds or mountains, or other material objects, but about
ordinary names in our language. Friends of the epistemic view have three options
in this situation. They might insist that our words have determinate meanings in
either of two ways. First, they might reject Reference Thesis, second, they might
suggest that there are, after all, some facts about the thoughts and practices of
speakers that determine the reference of names such as 'Kilimanjaro'. The third
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option is to accept that our words are vague. The first option is hardly plausible.
What Reference Thesis says is that whatever the connection is between our language
and the world it has to be established by our thoughts and practices. And what else
is there to establish such a connection? Nothing comes to mind. The second option
does not seem promising either. How could thoughts and practices of speakers
determine of every single grain of sand whether it is part of Kilimanjaro or not? Or
of every drop of water whether it belongs to the North Sea or to the Atlantic Ocean?
Our thoughts and practices are not that fine grained. The remaining alternative is to
accept the claim that names are vague, but that undermines the epistemic solution to
the problem of the many. The epistemic solution maintains that a name such as
'Kilimanjaro' has a determinate reference, but that we just do not know which object
is the referent of the name. Now friends of the epistemic view seem forced to retract
the first part, i.e. they have to give up the thesis that a name such as 'Kilimanjaro'
has a determinate reference.
4. The situation is now like this. Although the epistemic solution works well for
the problem of the many, it can't solve the problem of vague reference. So, we have
to look for a different solution to the problem of the many. According to the
linguistic view the problem of the many shows that names such as 'Kilimanjaro' and
'Puffy' and general nouns such as 'mountain' and 'cloud' are vague in the sense that
they don't have any determinate reference and extension. One challenge now is to
give an account of the truth of a sentence such as "There is exactly one cloud in the
sky" when, intuitively, there is only one cloud there. It is not enough just to say that
our language is vague, because for something to be a solution it must be able to
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retain what seems intuitively beyond doubt, for instance that in certain
circumstances it is determinately true that there is exactly one cloud in the sky.
The linguistic view consists of two parts.1 4 The first is an explanation of why
there are vague words in a language like English, the second is a systematic account
of the truth conditions of complex sentences in a vague language. The explanation
of why we have vague words in our language consists of two basic claims: First, a
claim about what kind of facts determine meaning, and second, the claim that these
facts leave meaning underdetermined. In the case of singular terms, the first part is
given by something like Reference Thesis from above.
Reference Thesis: A name n in a language L refers to e if and only if the
thoughts and practices of the speakers of L determine that n refers to e.
The claim that meaning is underdetermined by the relevant facts is then cashed out
in terms of which objects are candidate referents and to what extent the relevant
facts might distinguish between these as the actual referents of names in L. This is
how David Lewis puts it:
The reason it's vague where the outback begins is ... [that] there are many things,
with different borders, and nobody has been fool enough to try to enforce a choice
of one of them as the official referent of the word 'outback'. Vagueness is semantic
indecision. 15
The second part of the linguistic view is an account of truth conditions for
complex sentences and identity sentences containing vague constituents, whether
these are common nouns, names or predicates. The sentences
14 My discussion of the linguistic view is largely based on the writings of Vann McGee, in
particular his paper " 'Kilimanjaro' ".
15 David K. Lewis, On the Plurality of Worlds, p. 212.
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Kilimanjaro is the tallest mountain in Africa,
If Sparky is part of Kilimanjaro then Sparky is part of Kilimanjaro,
are certainly true. But friends of the linguistic view can not explain the truth of the
first by saying that the referent of the name 'Kilimanjaro' is denoted by the
description 'the tallest mountain in Africa', as standard semantics has it, since they
don't believe that there is such a thing as the referent of the name 'Kilimanjaro' or the
denotation of the description. The truth of the second sentences does not follow
from the standard truth table definition of '--' since both conjuncts are
indeterminate. Moreover, any truth table definition of '--' won't be able to
distinguish between the above sentence and
If Sparky is part of Kilimanjaro then Tom is bald,
where Tom is a borderline case of a bald person.
To account for the truth of sentences with vague count nouns and singular
terms some friends of the linguistic view have used supervaluation. Supervaluation
is a two stage process. First, one identifies ways in which words in the language
might admit of precisification, then one uses these precisifications to define a notion
of truth for the language in question. A precisification is a classical model, it is a
model in which every singular term has a determinate reference and every general
term has a determinate extension. In each such precisification the name
'Kilimanjaro' has a unique reference though it may differ from one precisification to
another what the reference is. But the notion of a precisification is not enough, one
needs a notion of an acceptable precisification.' 6 The distinction between an arbitrary
16 The notion of an acceptable precisification, as opposed to the unqualified notion of
precisification, cannot be defined within the supervaluation framework but must be taken as
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and an acceptable precisification is that the latter has to meet certain intuitive
constraints on what the semantic values of the terms in the language can be. These
constraints are basically twofold. First, there are constraints that one might call
'correspondence constraints'. For instance, a precisification that has as the reference
of the name 'Kilimanjaro' half of Tanzania is not acceptable since half of Tanzania is
determinately not what the name 'Kilimanjaro' refers to. In such a precisification
the correspondence between the name and the world has gone wrong. Second,
there are coherence constraints. In each acceptable precisification the object that is
the referent of 'Kilimanjaro' must also satisfy the description 'the tallest mountain in
Africa'. This is because the sentence "Kilimanjaro is the tallest mountain in Africa"
is definitely true and must, therefore, be true in each acceptable precisification.17
a primitive. See Kit Fine, "Vagueness, truth and logic", Synthese, Vol. 30 1975, pp. 265-300.
The paper is reprinted in Vagueness: A Reader, R. Keefe and P. Smith eds., MIT Press 1996. The
relevant passage is on p. 126 in the reprint.
17 Quine's thesis about inscrutability of reference might suggest that only the latter
constraints, i.e. the coherence constraints, are tractable. The argument might go something
like this: Suppose we have a class of precisifications where the reference of the name
'Kilimanjaro' meets the intuitive reference constraints. Now, we might define a permutation
function for this class of precisification in such a way that in the permutated precisifications
'Kilimanjaro' did not refer to a landmass in Tanzania but, say, to some number or other. The
rest of the expressions in the language would be permuted so that for any precisification in
the original class there would be a permuted precisification such that any sentence in the
original precisification and the corresponding sentence in the permutated precisification
agreed in truth value. If this was possible, then we could not distinguish the two classes of
precisifications in terms of how they assigned truth values, and, hence, could not say that the
precisifications in the first were acceptable while those in the second were not. But are such
permutations possible? Hilary Putnam has offered a proof to the effect that they are possible
("Appendix" in Reason, Trutth and History, Cambridge University Press 1981), but the proof
seems to be defective. The problem is that to guarantee that a permutation preserves the
truth conditions for modal sentences an individual has to exist at the same worlds as its
image exists. For ordinary physical objects this is a serious constraint. (This objection to
Putnam's alleged proof is due to Vann McGee.)
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Now we get to the second stage, namely how all this bears on the truth values
of sentences of English. The entire class of acceptable precisifications is taken to be a
model of English in the following way: If a sentence is true in every acceptable
precisification, then it is true in English, if it is false in every acceptable
precisification then it is false in English, and if it is true in some but false in other
precisifications, then it is indeterminate.
If we go back to the problem of the many we can see that according to the
linguistic view the dilemma posed by the Duplication Thesis,
Duplication Thesis: If p and q are indifferent then either both are true
or neither is,
is solved by going for the second horn; neither p nor q is true. But, neither p nor q is
false either, instead they are indeterminate. In some acceptable precisifications p is
true and q false, in some others q is true but p false.
5. Supervaluation enables friends of the linguistic view to account for the truth
values of ordinary English sentences when some constituent expressions are vague.
In particular, it allows that the sentence "There is exactly one cloud in the sky" to
come out true when, intuitively, there is only one cloud there despite the challenge
of the problem of the many. The reason why the sentence is true is that in each
acceptable precisification there is exactly one object that is a cloud in the sky, and so
in each such precisification the sentence "There is exactly one cloud in the sky" is
true.
What the problem of the many shows is that in different precisifications
different objects satisfy 'is a cloud in the sky' and, therefore, different objects will be
29
the referent of the name 'Puffy'. This leads to the conclusion that the sentence
"There is exactly one cloud in the sky" can be true while it is not true of any object
that it is the cloud in the sky, for different precisifications disagree about which
object it is.18 Let's say that a sentence is definitely true if it is true in all
precisifications and write 'Def S' if 'S' is such a sentence. The initial assumption of
the problem of the many is that it is definitely true that there is exactly one cloud in
the sky, i.e.
(1) Def (3x x is the cloud in the sky)
is true. The supervaluation account of vague singular terms tells us that this
sentence can be true while
(2) 3x Def (x is the cloud in the sky)
is not true. What the problem of the many shows is that (2) can't be true, but if truth
conditions of complex sentences are given by supervaluation then (2) does not need
to be true in order for it to be true that there is exactly one cloud in the sky. All that
is needed is that (1) be true and in the supervaluation framework (1) and (2) are not
equivalent.
We have seen how the linguistic view solves the problem of the many, but
how does it respond to the problem of vague reference? The problem of vague
reference is a reductio of the conjunction of three assumptions: (i) reference of
ordinary names such as 'Kilimanjaro' is determined, (ii) there are indifference
18 The sentence "There is something that is the cloud in the sky" is definitely true, since it is
true in each precisification, and yet it is not true of any thing that it is the cloud in the sky.
Here, truth behaves like necessity; the sentence "Someone is the tallest boy in the class" may
be necessary true (at least if by tallest we meant 'taller or equally tall to any other boy in the
class') and yet it is not necessary of any boy in the class that he is the tallest one.
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candidates such as K1 and K2, and (iii) insofar as reference is determined, it must be
determined by the thoughts and practices of speakers of the language. But this is
not a problem for friends of the linguistic view since they don't accept the first
assumption. The problem of vague reference was a problem for friends of the
epistemic view since they wanted to maintain all three assumptions and, hence, had
to find a way to refute the skeptic that challenged their claim that a name such as
'Kilimanjaro' had a determired reference. The challenge was that there are
indifference candidates, say K1 and K2, between which thoughts and practices of
speakers of the language in question are unable to decide as the reference of the
name 'Kilimanjaro'. In order to refute the skeptic friends of the epistemic view had
to find a fact that fixed whether the name 'Kilimanjaro' referred to Kl or K2. By
contrast, friends of the linguistic view do not face this problem since they accept the
skeptic's conclusion, and they accept it precisely because they believe there is no.
such fact. Our thoughts and practices don't determine whether our name
'Kilimanjaro' refers to one rather than the other. It is undecided.
'Vagueness is semantic indecision' is the central thesis of the linguistic view
and what makes the linguistic view worthy of being called 'a solution' to the
problem of the many and the problem of vague reference is that it can account for
how ordinary sentences have the truth values we expect them to have despite this
indecision.
6. So far so good for the linguistic view: we have a solution to the problem of the
many and the problem of vague reference is solved by the same means. But if we
shift the focus from clouds and language to beliefs, a different problem arises, I call
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it 'the problem of de re beliefs'. In the paper "The problem of the many" Unger
spells out the problem under the heading 'the problem of having an object in
mind'.19
We commonly suppose that, regarding various existing ordinary things, several
nearby stones, for example, we can think of each of them, or have each in mind...
But if there are millions of "overlapping stones" before me ... how am I to think of
a single one of them, while not then equally thinking of so many others, with each
of which "it" might so readily be confused? The presumed relations between us,
and our minds, and ordinary material complexes look to be in deep trouble.
And a little later Unger adds:
I suggest that up until now, at least, not one of us has ever really thought of any
existing stone or table or human hand.2 0
Now, what shall one make of this last problem? It isn't a contradiction, so
philosophers can live their professional life with it, and some may be willing to live
with it in their spare time as well. But this problem shows that if the linguistic view
is correct, we need a major revision of how we think of relations between us and
ordinary material objects.
Let's look closer at the problem. If I am entertaining a belief about a particular
object, if I have an object in mind as Jnger puts it and am believing that it is F, then
my belief can not be represented by "I believe that there is something that is F", but
rather by "There is something such that I believe of it that it is F". I can believe that
something is F without believing of anything in particular that it is F. If my cookie
disappears then I may believe that someone took my cookie without believing of
19 "The problem of the many", part A of section 12.
20 "The problem of the many", p. 456.
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anyone in particular that he or she took my cookie. This general belief can be
represented in the following way:
I believe {3x (x took my cookie)}.2 1
But once I have investigated the case and found out who the guilty one is my belief
will be more specific; we say that I believe of someone in particular that he took my
cookie. In other words, I will have a de re belief about the thief, and this de re belief
can be represented in the following way:
3x (I believe x took my cookie)).22
Similarly, I may believe that some cloud is the most bedutiful cloud ever; i.e. the
following might be true:
21 This formulation is neutral with respect to the debate between those who take belief to be
a sentential attitude and those who take it to be a propositional attitude. What is embedded
can either be a canonical representation of a sentence or a proposition.
22 Here I use the difference in scope to mark the distinction between de dicto and de re beliefs.
But it should be clear that the distinction between de re and de dicto beliefs is not just the
difference between wide and narrow scope. This is best seen in the case where we have
intermediate scope. The sentence "I believe the dude took my cookie" is ambiguous between
the following forms:
(i) I believe {3x (x = tyDude(y) A x took my cookie)}
(ii) 3x (I believe x = tyDude(y) A x took my cookie))
(iii) 3x (x = yDude(y) A I believe x took my cookie))
Here, the de dicto reading might be represented by (i) but the de re reading might be
represented by either (ii) or (iii). For present purposes we need not decide which formulation
represents best the de re reading, on either reading de re beliefs will be beyond human
capacity.
Alternatively, one might want to represent my de re belief that the dude took my cookie in
the following way:
3x (I believe ({f(x) A x took my cookie))
where '' stands for some description, perhaps purely qualitative, that uniquely singles out
the individual in question. But this won't help since as long as the description is something I
can comprehend, there will be many indifference candidates that satisfy it, and, hence, the
belief won't be singular.
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I believe 3{x (x is a cloud A Vy (y is a cloud -- x is more beautiful than y))).
But if I have the de re belief of Puffy that it is the most beautiful cloud ever, then my
attitude can not be described in the above way. In order to get the content of my
belief right, we must force the choice between different candidates, i.e. we must
place the existential quantifier outside the scope of my belief like this:
3.x (I believe {x = Puffy A Vy (y is a cloud - x is more beautiful than y))).
The question now is whether friends of the linguistic view can accommodate de re
beliefs such as the ones that I have been talking about and seem to be ordinary
everyday beliefs. The problem for the linguistic view (and the epistemic view as
well) is that since there are so many candidates that differ so minutely it would be
incredible if my cognitive powers were able to distinguish among them. Peter
Unger says that it would not only be incredible, it would be impossible.
But why is there a problem here? Why can't supervaluation come to rescue
here as it did before? The reason is that the referring entities that we were
considering before were names in a language, names such as 'Puffy' and
'Kilimanjaro', but in the case of reports of de re beliefs the referring is not done by
names but by variables. And while supervaluation can give an account of vague
names, it can't make room for vague variables. Variables are mere place holders for
objects and they just can't be vague. The only choice for friends of the linguistic
view is to give up the idea that people can have de re beliefs about such objects as
clouds, mountains and people, including beliefs about themselves, and try to
explain why we have the illusion that we do have de re beliefs about all sorts of
things.
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A friend of the linguistic view might say that what we ordinarily think of as de
re beliefs are just beliefs that can be reported by a sentence of the form "A believes
that a is F". This way of going about de re beliefs may actually seem to have
independent motivation. Consider for instance Quine's skepticism about de re
beliefs. Quine analyzed de re beliefs in terms of de dicto beliefs in roughly the
following way: To say of someone, say Paul, that he believes of a that it is F, is just
'o say that Paul believes that a sentence of the form "a is F" is true. Here, de re
beliefs are not a special kind of beliefs but, rather, a special way of describing
beliefs. 23 As we saw in relation to the problem of vague reference, a sentence of the
form "a is F" need not be singular in the sense that some particular object is said to
be F, and if the premisses of the problem of the many are right then such sentences
about ordinary material objects will never be singular.2 4 The distinction between de
re and de dicto beliets will not be a distinction between singular and general beliefs
but merely between beliefs that can be reported by sentences that have a singular
term in the subject place and beliefs that can be reported by sentences that have a
general term in the subject place.
This last problem may not show that the linguistic view is untenable, but, as I
said earlier, if it is right then some serious revisions in the way we think of our
23 See for instance Robert Stalnaker, "Belief attribution and context", Context and Content,
Oxford University Press 1999, p. 160.
24 More precisely, "a is F" will not be singular if 'a' is used to talk about ordinary material
objects, i.e. if 'a' is a name such as 'Kilimanjaro' or 'Puffy'. The situation may be different if 'a'
is a numeral or a name of an abstract object, although these also face a challenge about
vagueness. For instance, supposing that numbers are sets, we can't say whether what Fermat
referred to when he used the numeral '3' was a Zermelo's ({{0)} or von Neuman's {0, 0), 0,
(0)), or some other set. But the reasons for holding that the numerals are vague are different
from the problem of the many.
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relations to the external world are required. I will not go into the prospects of
undertaking such revisions, but instead move on and prepare the ground for the
ontological view.
3. The complex problem of the many
1. In order to spell out the ontological view, as I want to construe it, we have to
take back certain simplifications that I made earlier. When I laid out the problem of
the many at the beginning of this chapter I said that I would come back to the
notions of aggregation and constitution. Now is the time to fulfill that promise.
One of the premisses that the problem of the many relied on was Cloud Thesis.
Cloud Thesis: A cloud is an aggregate of droplets distributed in a suitable way.
But this thesis is unclear and obviously so since no attempt has been made to
explain what an aggregate is. Does an aggregate survive a replacement of parts?
What region of space does an aggregate occupy? What a friend of the ontological
view wants to know, in particular, is whether an aggregate has all its parts
determinately. So, what is this notion of aggregation?
When philosophers talk about aggregates (or compounds or complexes etc.) in
this context they often seem to have in mind some sort of mereological sum along
the lines of Classical Extensional Mereology. This notion is, arguably, insufficient
for the purposes of explaining the relation between ordinary objects and their parts,
such as clouds and droplets, since it does not say anything about temporal and
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modal properties of objects.2 5 This shortcoming can be dealt with in two ways. First,
one might suggest that the parts of objects are themselves temporal and modal,
time-world slices, and then have a principle of composition that was neither tensed
nor modalized. Alternatively the parts might be three dimensional objects, i.e.
objects that do not have a part at another time or another world, and instead have a
tensed and modalized principle of composition.
2. Those who want to take the first alternative and stick to the principle of
mereological sum in its simplest form (as defined in the Leonard and Goodman
calculus) as a principle governing material composition might be motivated by
simplicity considerations. 26 But simplicity is soon lost. In order to make room for
intuitive temporal and modal properties one has to accept time-world slices as the
basic constituents of the world, and to do that is to trade simplicity at one level in for
complexity at another. Besides, if the basic parts are time-world slices the definition
of mereological sum has to be changed in order to allow for sums of non-actual
entities as well as actual ones. This means that unless one is a modal realist, the
25 See for instance Ali Akhtar Kazmi, "Parthood and persistence", Canadian Journal of
Philosophy, Supplementary volume 16, University of Calgary Press 1996, and Judith Thomson,
"The statue and the clay", Nofis, Vol. 32, No. 2 1998.
26 It would not be fair to say that Leonard and Goodman themselves were motivated by such
considerations. Their concern in "The calculus of individuals and its uses" was more of a
logical or semantic nature than metaphysical. This should be clear from the following remark
from the closing paragraph of the paper: "[The paper] performs the important service of
divorcing the logical concept of an individual from metaphysical and practical prejudices,
thus revealing that the distinction and interrelation of classes and wholes is capable of a
purely formal definition, and that both concepts, and indeed all the concepts of logic, are
available as neutral tools for the constructional analysis of the world". (The calculus of
individuals and its uses", Tile Journal of Symbolic Logic, Vol. 5, No. 2 1940, p. 55).
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definition of mereological sum must allow that what does not exist has a sum. Not
only will there be such an object as the sum of the actual present slice of me and
Julius Caesar's nose, there will also be such an object as the sum of the actual present
slice of me and sonle daughter that Caesar might have had had his life been
different. This may not be inconsistent, but I'm not sure I know what it means, and
whatever one can say in favor of it, it won't be that it is particularly simple.
A different defect of the view under consideration is that it obscures the
dependency relation between what is actual and what is possible. Intuitively, what
is possible must depend on what is actual. When I say that my desk could have
been made of slightly different material I am saying of an actual object that it could
have been different, and whether my claim is true or false is going to depend on
what this actual object is like. It is not that all the possible worlds are given in
advance and the actual world is just one among them, differing from the others
simply in that it happens to be the one we inhabit. When it comes to metaphysical
possibility and necessity it seems to me (though not to David Lewis) that the realm
of possible worlds must be defined with reference to the actual world.27 Consider
the account Kripke gives of possible worlds towards the end of his first lecture in
Naming and Necessity.
An analogy from school ... will help to clarify my view. Two ordinary dice (call
them die A and die B) are thrown, displaying two numbers face up. For each die,
there are six possible results. hence there are thirty-six possible states of the pair
of dice, as far as the numbers shown face-up are concerned, though only one of
these states corresponds to the way the dice actually will come out ...
27 This goes counter to modal realism, at least as David Lewis has argued for it. But even if
my claims about possible worlds are contentious I will not defend them here.
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Now in doing these school exercises in probability, we were in fact introduced at
a tender age to a set of (miniature) 'possible worlds'. The thirty-six possible states
of the dice are literally thirty-six 'possible worlds'...
But when we talk in school of thirty-six possibilities, in no way do we need to
posit that there are some thirty-five other entities, existent in some never-never
land ...
And a little later he adds:
'Possible worlds' are little more than the miniworlds of school probability blown
large.28
If actual material objects are sums of time-world slices then what exists at the actual
world is in part determined by what exists at other possible worlds, which means
that the merely possible worlds are just as real as the actual one. 'rhey are just
somewhere in the never-never land, to borrow Kripke's words.
Someone might respond to my complaints about time-world slices by saying
that talk about such slices is not meant to be taken literally; such talk does not
commit one to there really being such entities. A claim like this is often heard in the
context of modal talk, and it is, I think, often quite legitimate. In Kripke's
framework we do, for instance, quantify over possible worlds and yet we want to
say that there are no such worlds, that they do not really exist. The plausibility of
such excuses depends on the way we use our possible worlds. The problem for
friends of time-world slices is that they make these entities defining constituents of
actually existing objects; an actual object is the sum of such-and-such time-world
slices, as one's library is, for instance, the collection of such-and-such books. And
28 Saul A. Kripke, Namning and Necessity, Harvard University Press 1980, pp. 16-18.
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just as the books must really exist if there is to be a library, so the time-world slices
must really exist if there are to be any actual objects. And this makes the excuse that
talk about possible worlds is just a manner of speaking unavailable to friends of
time-world slices.
3. The oddities, and obscurities, that time-world slices bring with them should
push us into the direction of a tensed and modalized principle of composition. To
extend the notion of mereological sum from Classical Extensional Mereology to take
into account tense and modality, I shall introduce a notion of fusion. A description
of the form "The fusion of xl, ..., x," is (i) a rigid designator, (ii) it denotes an object
at a time in a world only if all of x l, ..., x,, exist at that time in that world, and (iii) all
of xl , ... , .r,, are parts of the fusion of xl , ..., x,, and the fusion has no parts that do not
overlap one of xl, ..., Xn. 29 In a formal framework fusion would be represented by a
function f that takes as its argument a plurality of objects, x l, ... , x,, and returns as its
value a single object, y = f(xl, ..., x,).
In order for this notion of material composition to make room for intuitive
temporal and modal properties of material objects it has to be complemented by a
notion of constitution. Since aggregates have all their parts essentially, but ordinary
objects such as clouds and mountains can survive replacements of parts, ordinary
material objects cannot be fusions of basic elements. Clouds can't be fusions of
droplets and mountains can't be fusions of clods of earth. Instead, we shall say that
29 According to this what gets fused is a plurality of objects. We might as well have used a
notion of fusion according to which what gets fused is a set of objects. Nothing important
hinges on defining fusion in one way rather than the other. This notion of fusion resembles
Judith Thomson's notion of all-fusion in "The statue and the clay".
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clouds are, at any time, constituted by fusions of droplets and that mountains are, at
any time, constituted by fusions of clods of earth. Having to rely on a notion of
constitution is a departure from simplicity, but such a departure cannot be avoided
as long as one accepts that some material objects can survive replacements of parts.
4. Going back to the problem of the many, we can see that Cloud Thesis needs to
be replaced. Instead of saying that a cloud is identical to an aggregate of droplets we
shall say that a cloud is, at any time, constituted by such an aggregate.3 In other
words, we replace the initial Cloud Thesis with the following:
Cloud Constitution Thesis: A cloud is, at any time, constituted by an aggregate
of droplets distributed in a suitable way.
If we substitute Cloud Constitution Thesis for Cloud Thesis then the conclusion of
the problem of the many won't be that there are either many clouds in the sky or
none. Instead, it will be that there are either many cloud constituters in the sky that
do not completely overlap31 or there will be no cloud constituter there. Whether this
conclusion is problematic depends on what the constitution relation is like. If we
assume that a cloud and anything that constitutes it must overlap completely then
we have a problem since it will not be possible that there are different cloud
30 Unger acknowledges that something like this might be appropriate in a section titled "The
problem of identity through time" towards the end of his paper, but he thinks that this only
makes things worse.
31 Complete overlap can be defined in two ways; (i) in terms of spatial occupation, and (ii) in
terms of basic elements. According to the first way, two objects overlap completely if and
only if any region occupied by one is also occupied by the other. According to the second
way, two objects overlap completely if and only if exactly the same basic elements are parts of
them. For the present purposes it does not matter which way we go. On either definition
complete overlap is reflexive and transitive.
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constituters that do not completely overlap. In other words, having replaced Cloud
Thesis with Cloud Constitution Thesis we will have a problem of the many only if
we have some principle like the following:
The Pairing Principle: If a and b each constitutes a cloud at t and a and b do not
overlap completely, then a and b constitute distinct clouds at t.
I call this last principle 'the pairing principle', since it suggests that even if clouds
are not identical to fusions of droplets a cloud can, at any time, be paired with such
a fusion in a non-arbitrary way.
Stating the problem of the many in this more complex way does not make
much difference from the point of view of the epistemic or the linguistic views. It is,
however, crucial for the form of the ontological view that I will defend. My basic
thesis is that parthood is a vague relation but some philosophers might worry that
vague parthood leads to vague identity. If all objects are either basic entities, i.e.
non-composed objects, or fusions of such entities, then vague parthood will lead to
vague identity. But if ordinary objects are not identical to fusions of basic entities
but merely constituted by such fusions then an ordinary object, say a cloud, can be
vague with respect to parthood without being indeterminately identical to
something, say a fusion of droplets.
4. The ontological view
1. So far I have considered two solutions to the problem of the many, the
epistemic view and the linguistic view. The epistemic view offers a straight and a
rather simple solution to the problem, but runs foul of a different problem, the
problem of vague reference. The linguistic view, on the other hand, accepts the
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conclusion of the problem of the many and it also accepts the conclusion of the
problem of vague reference. But it blocks any inconsistent consequences by giving a
definition of truth according to which it can be true that there is exactly one cloud in
the sky while it is not true of any object that it is the cloud in the sky. However,
when it comes to the problem of de re beliefs, friends of the linguistic view have no
option short of biting the bullet and admitting that we need to reconsider seriously
our relations to the external world.
I now turn to a third kind of a solution to the problem of the many, the onto-
logical view. Under this heading are several proposals that all have in common that
they give an affirmative answer to the question: Is there vagueness in the world?3 2
Previous ontological proposals have mainly taken three forms. First, philosophers
have suggested that an object is vague if and only if it has borderline parts or if there
is no fact of the matter whether something is part of it. Others have suggested that
identity might be vague,33 and still others have thought that the theory of fuzzy sets
might be adapted to account for the vagueness of objects.3 4 To say that an object has
32 Some philosophers find it very strange to call things that are not representations vague. If
"n is vague" means "n does not have determined reference" then, of course, 'vague' can only
be applied to things that are representations. When I say that an object is vague the notion of
vagueness is not linguistic, and moreover, it is not the linguistic notion of vagueness applied
to non-linguistic entities. That would not make any sense. Rather, to say that an object is
vague is, on my view, to say that there isn't a fact of the matter whether something is part of
it. In this context, vagueness contrasts with determinacy rather than precision. Others, such
as Terence Parsons and Peter Woodruff say that an object is vague when there isn't a fact of
the matter whether it is identical to something else. Again, vagueness contrasts with
determinacy rather than precision.
33 For instance Terence Parsons and Peter Woodruff, "Worldly indeterminacy of identity",
Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society, Vol. 95 1995, pp. 171-191. Reprinted in Vagueness: A
Reader.
34 For instance Peter van Inwagen, Material Beings, Cornell University Press 1990.
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borderline parts or that there is no fact of the matter whether something is part of it
is just to report the fact of vagueness not to explain anything.3 5 What is needed in
addition, and what is usually lacking, is an explanation of what it is for something to
be a borderline part or why there is no fact of the matter whether one thing is part of
another. To say that an object is vague just in case it has a borderline part is good as
far as it goes, it just does not go very far.
According to the vague identity proposal, the cloud in Unger's story would be
indeterminately identical to one or another of the precise aggregates of droplets.
This is then taken to open the possibility of there being only one cloud in the sky
while there are numerous aggregates of droplets there. I find this unattractive, not
because of any logical difficulties3 6 but because I simply don't know what it might
mean to say of an object that it is indeterminately identical to some object, for then,
it seems, there would be an object that was indeterminately itself.
The idea that the theory of fuzzy sets might be applicable isn't much better,
although its problems are different. The theory of fuzzy sets is a generalization of
ordinary set theory. Instead of objects being either members or non-members of
sets, they cart also be members to a degree. Similarly, in what one might call a
theory of fuzzy objects, objects are not either parts or non-parts of other objects but
35 For instance Michael Tye, "Vague objects", Mind, Vol. 99, No. 396 1990. I say more about
this way of formulatin ' c ontological view in next chapter, section 2.
36 The logical implications of vague identity have been the subject of much discussion, most
of which draws on a one page paper by Gareth Evans. I shall not add to that bulk. I think that
it is generally agreed now that one can have logic with vague identity. Helpful discussions of
Evans' argument can be found in Vann McGee's "'Kilimanjaro"', and in Richard Heck's Jr.,
"That there might be vague objects (so far as concerns logic)" The Monist, Vol. 81, no. 2, pp.
274-296.
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also parts to a degree. So, for instance, if Sparky was part of Kilimanjaro to a degree
0.7 then it would not be fully a part of Kilimanjaro but it would be more of a part of
the mountain than was Spooky who was only part of Kilimanjaro to a degree 0.01.
But this I don't find attractive either since it is not properly a theory of vague objects
but of incredibly precise objects with a surprising structural feature.
2. I'll say more about fuzzy objects later, but now I turn to my own view. Instead
of vague identity or fuzzy objects, my suggestion is that parthood is a vague
relation. This has two components; (i) facts about parthood are not primitive but
determined by certain other facts about the objects in question, and (ii) sometimes
the primitive facts which determine facts about parthood fail to determine of
something whether it is a part or a non-part of something else. That is when we
have an instance of vague parthood. There are no degrees, there are just three
statuses; a is part of b, a is not part of b, and it is indeterminate whether a is part of b.
Now, if clouds don't have all their parts determinately, as we are allowing,
then the problem of the many does not arise since there will be no indifference
candidates. Suppose we have two fusions of droplets, Al and A2 that overlap Puffy
more or less. Now we might ask: Might either Al or A2 constitute Puffy? Suppose
it is indeterminate whether the droplet Sprinkle is part of Puffy and that Sprinkle is
part of Al but not part of A2. Offhand it seems that this should rule out Al and A2
as constituters of Puffy since they and Puffy disagree with respect to parthood; what
is indeterminately part of Puffy is either determinately or determinately not part of
Al and A2. And since any fusion is precise, this has nothing to do with Al and A2
in particular. Shall we then conclude that no fusion of droplets constitutes Puffy?
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We have to be careful about our notion of constitution. It is determinately true
that Puffy is constituted by droplets, but if this means that there is a fusion of
droplets that constitutes Puffy and if Puffy is vague then constitution had better not
be a precise relation, since then it will at best be indeterminate whether Puffy is
constituted by some fusion or other of droplets. The way to resolve this is to
distinguish between two notions of constitution, 'partial constitution' and 'exact
constitution'. The notion of partial constitution should entail two principles that are
relevant for our present concern. If c partially constitutes O then:
everything which is determinately part of O has a part that
overlaps some part of c at t,
no part of c is determinately not part of O at t.
Moreover, the two principles above should be the only extensional constraints on
partial constitution, although not the only constraints. Other constraints will have
to do with modal properties of the constituter and the constitutee.3 7 The basic idea
behind the notion of exact constitution is then this: c exactly constitutes O just in
case c partially constitutes O and it is determinate that anything that is not part of c
is not part of O. This definition of exact constitution turns out to be too simple, as I
discuss in Chapter Five, but it suffices for now.
If we accept the above constraints as the only extensional constraints on partial
constitution then there will be no extensional constraints that rule out the possibility
that two fusions that do not completely overlap both partially constitute a single
object. If we now go back to the Pairing Principle,
37 Full definition of the two notions of constitution are given in Chapter Five.
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The Pairing Principle: If a and b each constitutes a cloud at t and a and b do not
overlap completely, then a and b constitute distinct clouds at t,
and if the notion of constitution here is partial constitution, we can see that the
possibility of many non-overlapping constituters renders it simply false. It will not
be true that if two fusions each of which constitutes a cloud do not overlap
completely then they must constitute two distinct clouds.
If we accept the notion of partial constitution and reject the Pairing Principle
then we can maintain that there is only one cloud in the sky, that there is only one
cloud candidate in the sky, namely the cloud, and that we can know full well what
entity it is that we refer to when we point to the sky and say "Let's call that cloud
'Puffy"'. Of course there will be all sorts of things we don't know about the cloud;
we don't know where it will drift off to, we don't know how far away it is and we
don't know which droplets are parts of it. But this ignorance is no barrier to our
ability to single out a unique object as the referent of the name 'Puffy' and to believe
of it that it is the most beautiful cloud ever.
My view is that parthood and constitution are vague relations, but I have not
offered any details of the view. 38 So, rather than saying that since parthood and
constitution are vague we can solve the problem of the many, my arguments might
be taken to support the following conditional proposition: If parthood and constitu-
tion are vague, then we can solve the problem of the many. In the remainder of this
chapter I will address the charge that the conditional proposition is simply false,
that one can reformulate the problem in such a way that even with vague parthood
and constitution one cannot avoid the problem.
38 I give a detailed account of parthood in Chapter Four and in Chapter Five I define
material constitution.
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5. Is the ontological view really a solution?
1. It is clear that the ontological view allows us to reject the conclusion of the
problem of the many, as I formulated it, since it rejects the Pairing Principle
The Pairing Principle: If a and b each constitutes a cloud at t and a and b do not
overlap completely, then a and b constitute distinct clouds at t,
and once we give up the Pairing Principle we don't have to accept that any fusion is
the fusion of droplets that constitutes the cloud. There will be various fusions of
droplets in the sky roughly where the cloud is, but since in general there is not a
one-one correlation between clouds and fusions of droplets that are constituters of
clouds, we don't have to accept that if either of Al and A2 constitutes the cloud the
other doesn't.
but one might wverry that the solution was too provisional and that an analo-
gous problem could be raised by shifting the focus. The charge would be that
although fusions such as Al and A2 would not be problematic, there might be some
other indifference candidates by mention of which the problem could be restated.
The new indifference candidates might be objects that differed only in that one was
a little less vague than the other; there might, for instance, be a droplet, call it
'Sprinkle', such that it was indeterminate whether it was an indeterminate part of
the first candidate but not indeterminate whether it was an indeterminate part of the
second one. In other words, although precise objects are not indifference candidates
in a way that poses a problem, there might be vague indifference candidates that
were problematic.
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The basic point of the problem of the many is that in great many cases one can
draw indifferent boundaries, and it does not matter whether these boundaries are
precise or not. Consider, for instance, the theory of fuzzy objects. Even though
proponents of fuzzy objects can reject the original indifference candidates as
problematic, it seems that they will still be committed to all sorts of indifference
candidates, say, cloud like objects that are slightly differently fuzzy, objects that
differ only in that something is part of one to degree 0.7 but part of the other to
degree 0.70001. Why should the first be the cloud rather than the second? This is
why Vann McGee says that the theory of fuzzy objects, which strikes him as pretty
implausible to begin with, appears even worse on a closer inspection.3 9
2. If we see the problem from this point of view, then chances for a straight solu-
tion seem rather bleak; n.o matter how we draw boundaries the problem of the many
can be reformulated with respect to those very boundaries. But this point of view is
a deceptive one. Ordinarily we don't individuate objects by drawing boundaries
but as instances of kinds and as the subjects of some contingent truths. We say: "I
shall call the cloud in the sky 'Puffy"'. Here an object is individuated as belonging
to the kind 'cloud' and as satisfying the predicate 'is in the sky'. Similarly, we may
say, "the man by the bar is drinking champagne" or "the planet closest to Sun is
Mercury". In no cases do we draw a boundary, not explicitly at least.40
39 "'Kilimanjaro"', p. 143. Unger makes some comments to the same effect in "The problem
of the many", p. 426.
4( One might wonder whether we are any better off if we individuate objects as instances of
kinds and subjects of contingent truths rather than by drawing boundaries for the following
reason: There might exists many kinds: mountains, mountains*, mountainsA etc., that are so
similar that we don't know which one our word 'mountain' refers to, and, therefore, when we
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But what we do ordinarily isn't the final court, we need to ask whether it
could be that for each way of individuating an object, there is an equivalent way of
individuating it that involves the drawing of a boundary. It is not clear how one
could answer this question. On the one hand, the problem of the many might be
taken to show that it is impossible to individuate ordinary material objects by
drawing boundaries around collections of basic elements. On the other hand, one
might be presented with the following dilemma. Either ordinary macroscopic
objects are wholly made of some more basic elements in which case they can be
individuated in terms of those basic elements, i.e. by drawing a boundary. This is
the first horn of the dilemma and taking it leads to the problem of the many. Or,
and this is the second horn, such objects are mereologically simple, i.e. they are not
composed of basic elements. But surely, ordinary objects are composed of basic
elenlents, clouds are made of droplets, mountains of clods of earth, and all these are
made of atoms. So, it looks as if we are stuck with the problem and the best we can
do is to look for ways to alleviate the consequences. But the dilemma is a false one.
It presupposes that all objects must have their parts determinately, either absolutely
or to a degree. My point is that once we give that presupposition up, we can have a
straight solution to the problem.
individuate an object by saying "It is the tallest mountain in Africa" there might, after all, be
many candidates among which we were unable to distinguish. My reply is two twofold.
First, even if there are many candidates because there are many slightly different kinds
among which we are unable to distinguish, this would not be as bad as the original problem
of the many since the problematic many do not belong to the same kind. Second, it is not
clear that there are all these different kinds, or even if there are many kinds of mountain like
things that differ only minutely from the kind mountain, it is not clear that there is a similar
multiplicity of kinds of living beings. And although this last possibility may still leave us
something of a problem it is much less serious than the initial problem of the many.
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Does Ontological Vagueness Make Sense?
In the previous chapter we saw that with a vague parthood relation we can solve the
problem of the many without running into other related problems. In particular, we
do not face the problem of vague reference or the problem of de re beliefs. This is not
to say that the ontological view comes for free. The idea that there are vague objects
has faced some strong objections, three of which I shall look at in the present
chapter. The first objection is that the idea that there are vague objects is a fallacy of
verbalism; vagueness and precision are said to apply to language, and
representations in general, but not to objects. The second objection is that the
ontological view is inconsistent, and the third objection is that once the ontological
view is spelled out in a consistent way then it is not clearly distinct from the view
that language is vague.
1. Is the ontological view a fallacy of verbalism?
1. In the 1920s Russell wrote that the idea that objects might be vague was a
fallacy of verbalism. Representations such as names, reports or pictures could be
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vague, but objects could not. But Russell also maintained that it was the same fallacy
to say of objects that they were precise. Objects where just not the kind of things that
were either vague or precise. But what was Russell's notions of vagueness? Russell
defined vagueness in terms of precision or accuracy.
The exact definition [of accuracy] is as follows: one system of terms related in
various ways is an accurate representation of another system of terms related in
various other ways if there is a one-one relation of the terms of the one to the
terms of the other, and likewise a one-one relation of the relations of the one to the
relations of the other, such that, when two or more terms in the one system have a
relation belonging to that system, the corresponding terms of the other system
have the corresponding relation belonging to the other. 41
In short, a representation is accurate if there is a one-one relation between it and
what it represents. A representation is then vague when the relation is one-many. In
the case of singular terms vagueness contrasts not with accuracy but precision. To be
precise for a name is for there to be one-one correspondence between it and some
object in the world. Russell then adds: "Maps, charts, photographs, catalogues, etc.
all come within this definition in so far as they are accurate". In short, we can say
that accuracy is isomorphism. Examples of vague representations that he offers are
"a photograph which is so smudged that it might equally represent Brown or Jones
or Robinson" and, he says, "a small-scale map is usually vaguer than a large scale
map, because it does not show all the turns and twists of the roads, rivers, etc. so
41 Bertrand Russell, "Vaguenless", p. 66. The paper first appeared in Aulstralasian Journal of
Philosophy and Psychology, Vol. 1 1923. It is reprinted in Vagueness: A Reader, R. Keefe and P.
Smith eds., MIT Press 1996. Page references are to the latter.
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that various slightly different courses are compatible with the representation that it
gives" . 42
We need not go into the details of Russell's view, what matters for our
purposes is the idea that precision (and accuracy) is a one-one relation between a
representation and what is represented. Given this idea there is no room for vague
objects, except in so far as these objects are representations. We might perhaps sum
up Russell's view in the following way: Objects are only vague as representations, in
and of themselves objects cannot be vague.
2. Russell was right that talk about vague objects is dubious given the notion of
vagueness he had in mind. I am, however, inclined to regard such talk as simply
false rather than a fallacy of verbalism. If an object was vague in and of itself then
that object would have to bear a one-many relation to itself. But how could that be?
Some philosophers have suggested that identity might be a vague relation and
perhaps they might accept Russell's notion of vagueness and yet maintain that
objects could, after all, be vague in and of themselves. I shall, however, side with
Russell on this point; objects can't be vague in and of themselves. However, if we
can say that an object can represent itself, and if identity is a one-one relation, then it
seems in the spirit of Russell's view to say that objects are, after all, precise.
Now, how does Russell's criticism apply to my notion of vagueness? There is a
sense in which my view is in agreement with Russell's. On my view no object is
vague in and of itself since vagueness with respect to parthood requires at least two
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42 Russell, "Vagueness", p. 66.
objects; an object is vague only with respect to some other object. But, and perhaps
more to the point, it is not clear that Russell's concerns are at all relevant for my
notion of vagueness since my notion does not contrast with accuracy or precision,
but with determinacy.
3. Even if Russell's expressed concerns about the idea that there are vague
objects do not affect my view there is a cause for concern here, a concern that has to
do with the fallacy of verbalism. If relations are sets of ordered pairs and if the
parthood predicate is vague then it may be indeterminate which set of ordered pairs
it stands for, i.e. the relation between the predicate and sets of ordered pairs will be
one-many. But to conclude from the vagueness of the predicate that there must be a
set of indeterminate ordered pairs would be to commit the fallacy of verbalism. We
can make sense of an ordered pair where the first element is some smudged
photograph and the second is a collection of objects, say Brown, Jones and Robinson.
Similarly, we can make sense of an ordered pair where the first element is the
parthocd predicate and the second element is a collection of different sets of ordered
pairs. But we can't maintain that there are ordered pairs of which it is indeterminate
which objects they have as members. Here, indeterminacy seems to apply to
representations but not to the objects represented.
Things are, however, more complicated than the above illustration suggests.
Sometimes it does seem appropriate to attribute indeterminacy to things other than
representations. Some philosophers, going all the way back to Aristotle, have argued
that the future is indeterminate, i.e. that facts about the present fail to determine the
future. Whatever the merits or defects of this view are, it is at least generally
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accepted that it is not a fallacy of verbalism. Now, if it is not a fallacy of verbalism
to say that the future is indeterminate because the present does not determine it,
then why should it be a fallacy to say that parthood is indeterminate because the
primitive facts on which it depends do not determine it? On the face of it these
might seem on a par but on closer examination we can see that they are not.
Suppose that the determination relation is spelled out in terms of logical
consequence. If the future is indeterminate then there is no singular proposition
about some future event that follows from a set of proposition describing the past
and the present, i.e. the principle
-.3r(F F v r Vf 
is true, where 'f is a singular proposition about he future, r is a set of propositions
describing the past and the present and 'V' reads 'it is indeterminate whether'. The
question here is whether the above principle makes sense, and in particular,
whether accepting it would make one guilty of the fallacy of verbalism. think that
most philosophers who do not accept it would say that it is simply false rather than
a fallacy.
But if accepting the above principle is not a fallacy of verbalism, why should
the result of substituting a proposition about parthood for the one about the future
be such a fallacy, i.e. why should there be anything wrong with accepting
-,3r(r p r p) -- Vp,
where 'p' is a singular proposition about parthood? Here, things are not as simple as
they might seem. If we combine the view that relations are sets of ordered pairs
with the view that the only actual events are past and present events, as the
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Aristotelian view would have it, then it follows that there will be no relations
between present events and future events. No future event can be a member of
binary relations since there are no future events. They don't exist. There may be facts
about the future, for instance the fact that either there will be or there won't be a sea
battle tomorrow. But as of now, there is no future sea battle that can be a member of
any ordered pair. And that is why it can be indeterminate whether there will be a
sea battle tomorrow without there being indeterminate ordered pairs. When it
comes to parthood things are different. If it is indeterminate in the ontological sense
whether Sprinkle is part of Puffy and if binary relations are sets of ordered pairs,
then, since both Sprinkle and Puffy exists, there would exist an indeterminate
ordered pair. And that would be absurd.
The only way around this for friends of vague objects is to reject the view that
relations are sets of ordered pairs. It :night actually seem that that is exactly what
any sane view should suggest. An ordered pair is an abstract object dependent on
the existence of sets. Should the same be true of, say, the fatherhood relation? My
being the father of my daughter should not depend on the existence of any set, and
my bearing the fatherhood relation to my daughter should only depend on my
being her father and, hence, also not depend on the existence of any set. But
perhaps we should understand the view that binary relations are sets of ordered
pairs as a claim about truth conditions of relational propositions such as "aPb". The
claim would be that "aPb" is true just in case the ordered pair <a,b> falls within the
extension of the predicate 'P'. But if this is the role of ordered pairs then there is no
problem for vague relations. If 'P' stands for a vague relation then the following is a
partial specification of the truth conditions for sentences containing 'P':
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If <a,b> is a member of the determinate extension of 'P' then "aPb" is true.
If <a,b> is a member of the determinate anti-extension of 'P' then "aPb" is
false.
The determinate extension of 'P' will be a set of ordered pairs, and so will the
determinate anti-extension of 'P' be. But there is no need to identify the relation
with any set of ordered pairs. In fact, nothing one way or the other needs to be said
about the ontological status of relations. So, it seems that the view that there are
vague relations need not commit us to indeterminate ordered pairs, and the
ontological view can be cleared of the charge of making the fallacy of verbalism.
2. Is the ontological view consistent?
i. Now 1 turn to the charge that the ontological view is inconsistent. If Puffy is
vague at time t, i.e. if here.is at least one droplet of which it is indeterminate that it
is part of Puffy, then there is no set that is the set of all and only those droplets that
are parts of Puffy at t. 43 And this claim is far from innocent; given some rather weak
assumptions its negation can be proved.
From the following two premisses:
(1) There is at least one droplet that is part of Puffy,
(2) There are fewer than n droplets that are parts of Puffy,44
43 This is on the assumption that sets are not vague, i.e. that set membership is a precise
relation.
44 If we take premiss (2) to be equivalent to:
For any k, if k is the number of droplets that are parts of Puffy
then n is larger than k,
then it is trivially true by falsity of the antecedent for any number ni, since there is no number
which satisfies the definite description 'the number of droplets that are parts of Puffy'. So,
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where n is some sufficiently large number, one can derive, using only classical logic
and modest principles of set theory, the following proposition:
(3) 3x Vy (y is an element of x -- y is a droplet that is part of Puffy).
The inference from (1) and (2) to (3) is fairly straight forward.4 5 The set-theoretic
principles that are needed are:
Extensionality: There are no distinct sets with the same members.
Singletons: For any x there is a set with x as its only member.
Pairwise Union: Any two sets have a union.
To see how (3) follows from (1) and (2) along with classical logic and these
principles of set theory, it is convenient to consider an object that is smaller than the
average cloud. Suppose we have an object o which consists wholly of droplets but
has not more than three droplets. We assume that the only droplets that are
candidates for being part of o are dl, d2, and d3, and that o! is vague with respect to
these droplets, i.e. it is indeterminate whether at least one of them is part'of o. Then
we assume for reductio that there is no set that is the set of all and only the droplets
that are parts of o.
rather than taking (2) to state that there is a number n that is larger than some number k, we
can take (2) two be equivalent to a large existential sentence
3x 1 3X2 ... 3 n[X 2 ^ Xl X2 3 ... X2 A ... X,-l...Xn A
--, (x1 is part of Puffy A x2 is part of Puffy A ... x,1 is part of Puffy)].
And this sentence suffices for the following derivation.
45 If premiss (2) said that there were at most finitely many droplets that were parts of Puffy,
rather than have it stipulate some large finite upper bound, one needs mathematical
induction to derive (3) from (1) and (2). But mathematical induction might seem suspicious
in this context. The thought would be that mathematical induction works only for precise
concepts, but not for imprecise ones. However, having (2) stipulate some large upper bound
seems strong enough.
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1. -,3x Vy (Y ex -yPo )
2. Vx 3y -(y ex <- yPo )
The next two lines are the assumptions that something is part of o and that anything
that is part of o must be a member of the set of {dl, d2, d3}.
3. 3x( Po )
4. Vx (xPo - x e {d1, d2, d3 )
What follows is then just simple predicate logic.
5. 3y -(y {d1 , d2, d3 } - yPo) UI on line 2
6. (-,dlPo v -,d2Po) v -,d 3Po PL from line 5
This tells us that there are at most 2 droplets that are parts of o.
7. 3y -,(y E d1, d2) - yPo ) UI on line 2
8. (-dlPo v -- 2Po) v d3Po PL from line 7
9. --dPo v --d2 Po PL form lines 6 and 8
Then vwe repeat the steps taken in ines 7 - 9 with (dI . d3} and {d2, 13} in place for {dl,
d2 ), which gives us
10. (-dlPo v --d2Po) A (--dlPO v --d31) A (-d 2Po v -d3 Po)
This tells us that o has at most one droplet as a part. But we can continue.
11. 3y -,(y E {d} <- yPo ) UI on line 2
12. --dPo v (d2Po v d3Po) PL from 11
From the first two conjuncts on 10 we get
13. --dlPo v -,(d2Po v d3Po)
14. -,dPo PL from 12 and 13
Now we can repeat the steps taken in lines 11 - 14 for d2} and {d3} in place for {d1} on
line 11. From this we can conclude
15. -,dlPo A -' 2Po A --d 3Po
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But now lines 4 and 15 allow us to conclude that nothing is part of o
16. --3x ( xPo )
17. 3x (xPo) A -- 3x( xPo) From 3 and 16.
18. 3x y (y E x - yPo ) From 17 and 1 by reductio.
What the above argument shows is that an object of which only three objects might
be parts can't be vague in the sense that its parts do not form a set. Similar
reasoning will establish the corresponding solution for any object that is composed
of at most n objects where n is some sufficiently large number; i.e. if Puffy is
composed of no more than, say, octovigintillion droplets at any time, then an
argument analogous to the one above will prove the following proposition:
(3) 3x Vy (y is an element of x "- y is a droplet that is part of Puffy).
What proposition (3) says, or so it seems, is that there exists a set that is the set of all
and only the droplets that:are parts of Puffy. And this contradicts my view.
There are three ways we might try to resolve this contradiction. First, we
might argue that (3) did not, after all, contradict the claim that there is no set which
is the set of all and only the droplets that are parts of Puffy by claiming that
whenever a sentence had an indeterminate constituent it was subject to some sort of
paraphrasing that avoided the contradiction. Second, we might give up set theory.
Third, we might give up classical logic.
The first way might be motivated by the observation that the embedded
biconditional in (3) has the notion of parthood on the right side, and since we are
allowing that parthood might be vague, we might need an interpretation of the '"'
symbol which allowed that the whole proposition be true while a constituent
proposition is indeterminate. But I don't see how this could serve our purposes
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here. We can prove (3) and the negation of (3) is a direct consequence of my view.
That (3) must be true, given (1) and (2) along with modest set theory and classical
logic, is not something an interpretation of the biconditional can call into question,
rather any interpretation of the biconditional must accommodate the truth of (3)
given the initial conditions.
The second way, i.e. giving up set theory, does not look promising either. The
problem is that the challenge might be repeated in terms of collections or pluralities.
So, abandoning sets would not be enough, one would also have to abandon
collections or pluralities. And having done that most of mathematics would have to
be abandoned as well, and the price has become too steep.
The remaining option is to give up classical logic. In particular, blocking the
derivation of (3) from (1) and (2) requires giving up the law of excluded middle. If
the law of excluded middle is not valid then, instead of being provably true, (3)
might be indeterminate. What the above demonstration shows is not that vague
constitution is inconsistent but that accepting vague constitution comes at a price.
But how high a cost is this? I think that if one is drawn to vague objects, for
whatever reasons, one should not be committed to the law of excluded middle. If it
is indeterminate whether a is part of b then one should not expect the sentence "aPb
v -aPb" to be true.
3. Can the ontological view be distinguished from the linguistic one?
1. Mark Sainsbury has argued that there is no deep thesis about ontological
vagueness that is clearly distinct from the thesis that all vagueness has its roots in
language, and presumably other forms of representations. I shall call this
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Sainsbury's thesis. This may seem like an unlikely thesis since part of the thesis that
there are vague objects is just the claim that objects themselves are vague, and this
claim is clearly at odds with the linguistic view. But the point is different. It is clear
what the intended reading of the basic claim of the ontological view is, namely that
there are vague objects. But this claim might have an unintended reading, and if
there was such a reading that explained vagueness in linguistic terms, then one
could accept all the basic claims of the ontological view, and reap all the benefits
that come with it, without committing oneself to ontological vagueness. What
would remain to distinguish the linguistic view, which we get from the unintended
reading, from the intended ontological view, would be the bare claim that there are
vague objects. A claim that nothing would hinge on.
Sainsbury begins his paper "Why the world cannot be vague" with the
following report:
Whether or not the world is vague appears to be a deep issue. This paper reports
the results of a search for a clear and substantive thesis to the effect that the world
itself, as opposed to our language or concepts, is vague. Such a thesis of "ontic
vagueness" ought to reflect the apparent depth of the issue, and so its truth or
falsehood should be a matter of controversy. I did not find such a thesis. 46
The problem that Sainsbury has in finding a thesis of 'ontic vagueness' that reflects
the depth of the issue is that once he has found a thesis that is clearly incompatible
with the linguistic view, that thesis is provably wrong. In the previous section I
defended the ontological view against one charge of inconsistency, now I consider
whether it is clearly distinguishable from the linguistic view.
46 Tle Southern Journal of Philosophy, Supplementary Volume 33, 1994, p. 63.
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Sainsbury has put his finger on a real problem, although not a problem that is
unsolvable for friends of ontological vagueness. To see what the problem is
consider how ontological vagueness is commonly defined. Take, for instance, the
following definition offered by Trenton Merricks.
There is [ontological] vagueness ... if, for some object and some property, there is
no determinate fact of the matter whether that object exemplifies that property.4 7
Or this definition given by Michael Tye.
I shall classify a concrete object o as vague ... if, and only if, (a) o has borderline
spatio-temporal parts and (b) there is no determinate fact of the matter about
whether there are objects that are neither parts, borderline parts, nor non-parts
of 0.48
The problem with these definitions is that saying that an object has borderline parts
or that there is no fact of the matter whether some object has some property does not
give us ontological vagueness. To say this is just to report the fact of vagLeness.
The contrast between the ontological and the linguistic views will show, if at all, in
how we explain this fact, i.e. how we explain what it is to be a borderline part or
why there is no fact of the matter. We can then put Sainsbury's thesis in the
following way: There is no explanation of vagueness that is clearly ontological
rather than linguistic. I won't contest Sainsbury's claim concerning the formulations
of the ontological view that he considers, instead I will argue that my thesis is
clearly distinct from a thesis about linguistic vagueness.
47 Trenton Merricks, "Varieties of vagueness", Philosophy and Phenomenological Research, Vol.
LXII, No. 1 January 2001, p. 145.
48 Michael Tye, "Vague Objects", p. 535-536.
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2. The question we want to answer is this: Does my thesis admit of a linguistic
interpretation? There isn't going to be any quick answer to this question, nor
perhaps will the answer be conclusive in the end. But, it should at least be clear that
accepting Sainsbury's thesis is very costly. On the face of it the two views seem
readily distinguishable in terms of certain logical properties of the indeterminacy
operator 'V'. If we hold the linguistic view then 'V' will most naturally be a
sentential operator, whereas on the ontological view it should attach to closed
sentences as well as open formulas inside the scope of quantifiers. For instance, on
the ontological view, the sentence
(1) 3.ry V Py
comes out true when the value of 'x' is Sparky and the value of 'y' is Kilimanjaro.
But if vagueness is linguistic, for instance if the vagueness of "Sparky is part of
Kilimanjaro" is due to the vagueness of the name 'Kilimanjaro', then sentences
where 'V' attaches to open formulas inside the scope of a quantifier as in (1) should
be expected to be false; even if singular terms in the language are vague, variables
can not be vague. The reason for this is that variables are mere place holders for
objects and not entities in a language for which the thoughts and practices of
speakers must determine a meaning.
We might also distinguish the ontological view from the linguistic one in
terms of restrictions on the inference from
V aPb
where 'a' and 'b' are some singular terms, to
(1) 3.y V xPy.
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Such an inference is more restricted on the linguistic view than it is on the
ontological view. The reason for this is that the inference is only valid when 'a' and
'b' are precise names, and on the ontological view a name such as 'Kilimanjaro' will
be precise while vague on the linguistic view.
It seems then that the ontological view has two features that distinguish it
from the linguistic view. First, 'V' attaches to open formulas as well as closed
sentences and, second, existential generalization on a sentence of the form "7 aPb" is
valid.
3. There is, however, a complication here. In the sentence
(2) 3x V xP(Kilimanjaro),
'V' attaches to an open formula inside the scope of an existential quantifier and this
ought to come out true on the linguistic view. It just says that there is something of
which it is indeterminate whether it is part of Kilimanjaro. But in (2) the question
about indeterminacy should not be seen as a question about vague objects or
singular terms but as a question about vague predicates. In this case one might treat
'P(Kilimanjaro)' as a vague one place predicate. The predicate 'red' is similar. If
'red' is vague it ought be true that there is something of which it is indeterminate
whether 'red' applies to it. In other words,
(3) 3x V Red(x)
ought to come out true on the linguistic view. But if (3) can be true on the linguistic
view, why not (1)? The answer is that if 'P' is a vague predicate then (1) can come
out true on the linguistic view. We might read (1) as: "It is indeterminate of some
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ordered pair whether it is in the extension of 'P"'. So, it is not without qualifications
that the logic of indeterminacy appropriate for the linguistic view is sentential logic
rather than predicate logic.
In order to restore the distinction, in this respect, between the linguistic and
the ontological views it might seem that we had only one alternative, namely to
make use of second order logic and quantify over properties and relations as well as
objects. And this might seem problematic. However, I don't think that embracing
second order logic is our only way of avoiding Sainsbury's thesis.
If the linguistic theory explains the fact of vagueness by reference to semantic
indecision and accounts for the truth conditions of sentences by supervaluation,
then even if 'P' is a vague predicate an inference from
V aPb
to its existential generalization
(1) 3xy V xy
will not be valid. The inference is valid only when the names 'a' and 'b' are precise
and on the linguistic view names of ordinary material objects are not precise while
on the ontological view they are precise.
4. There is still one gap that has to be filled before we can reject Sainsbury's
thesis. This gap has to do with the metatheory for the quantifiers. A substitution
instance of (1) is
V (Sparky)P(Kilimanjaro),
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and this is a true proposition. This means that if the quantification in (1) is
substitutional rather than objectual then (1) will be true on the linguistic view and
the inference from
V aPb
to its existential generalization
(1) 3xy V xPy,
will be valid. In order to distinguish the two we must add that quantification is
objectual rather than substitutional. The question then is whether we can in the end
distinguish these two kinds of quantification.
In "Ontological relativity" Quine has doubts about the availability of such a
distinction. Quine introduces a notion of inseparability for uncovered models in the
following way: The named objects are inseparable from the nameless ones if, and
only if, all properties of the nameless objects that we can express are shared by the
named objects.49 When it comes to vagueness, we need to modify the above
definition of inseparability in the following way: instead of talking about 'all
properties' we should restrict our attention to 'all determinate properties', i.e.
Nameless objects are inseparable from named objects iff all properties that the
nameless objects have determinately and we can express are also had
determinately by the named objects.
The idea here is that we can only separate two objects if it is determinate that one
has a property that the other lacks. Now, a friend of the linguistic view will accept
(i) that the objects outnumber the names and (ii) that the unnamed objects are
67
49 Ontological Relativity, p. 65.
inseparable from the named ones in our sense of that term. If they weren't
inseparable, they would differ in a way that allowed speakers of the language in
question to resolve linguistic vagueness. And if the unnamed objects are inseparable
from the named ones then, Quine maintains, we will be unable to "distinguish
objectively between referential [i.e. objectual] quantification and a substitutional
counterfeit". 50 If Quine is right that we can't distinguish between these two forms of
quantification then perhaps Sainsbury's thesis might still stand: It would be
impossible to formulate the ontological view in such a way as to exclude
interpretations that explained the vagueness as a linguistic rather than an
ontological phenomenon.
But we have a good reason to reject Quine's conclusion. Vann McGee has
argued that if we look at counterfactual circumstances we can show that Quine's
worry is unfounded. The basic idea is that even if named and nameless objects are
actually inseparable, that is an accidental feature of this world. Two objects may be
inseparable in this world but readily separable in some other world.
Suppose that there is some property - call it F - that no individual that exists in the
actual world possesses in w, but that at least one individual that exists in w but not
in the actual world possesses in to. If quantification is objectual, (3x) F(x) will be
true in w; if quantification is substitutional, it will be false. 51
McGee's point is based on two assumptions that are worth mentioning. First, that
names don't change their designation when we move from one world to another
and, second, that it is impossible to name counterfactual individuals. And since
50 Ontological Relativity, p. 67.
51 Vann McGee, " 'Everything' ", Between Logic and Intluition, Gila Sher and Richard Tieszen
eds., Cambridge University Press 2000.
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these assumptions are very plausible Sainsbury's thesis isn't convincing. In fact, I
think that McGee's assumptions are true in which case Sainsbury's thesis is not only




The basic idea behind my notion of vague parthood is simple. First, facts about
parthood are non-primitive in the sense that for two objects to be related as part to
whole there must be some other primitive facts which determine that the objects are
so related. Second, sometimes the primitive facts fail to determine oi some two
objects whether one is part of the other. That is when we have an instance of vague
parthood.
The idea that there are primitive facts that determine non-primitive facts is
common in philosophy; it is, for instance, behind the linguistic view of vagueness.
According to the linguistic view there are primitive facts about thoughts and
practices of speakers that determine the non-primitive facts about meaning.
Vagueness is then explained as the result of the primitive facts' not fixing whether,
say, the name 'Kilimanjaro' refers to this or that landmass in Tanzania. The
structure of the ontological view of vagueness is similar; vagueness is explained by
the primitive facts' not fixing whether Sparky is part of Kilimanjaro. The task of
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spelling out the ontological view consists in specifying what the primitive facts are
and what the determination relation is.
1. Vague parthood
1. I regard the parthood relation a three place relation, x is part of y at time t.
However, in what follows I will ignore the place for time except in definitions and
elsewhere where time is specially relevant. My basic thesis about parthood entails
that
(1) 3xy V xPy,
is true, where 'V' stands for 'it is indeterminate whether' and 'P' stands for 'is part
of'. The variables 'x' and 'y' could, in principle at least, range over anything that can
enter into the parthood relation, be it abstract objects, events or whatever else comes
to mind. However, [ shall focus on the special case where 'x' and 'y' range over
material objects.
In Chapter Two we saw that if we can have (1) we can solve the problem of the
many. The question that now needs to be answered is what makes a proposition of
the form "V aPb" true. Without an answer to this question we do not have a thesis
to defend. What we need is to complete the schema
V aPb iff ... ,
where 'a' and 'b' are precise singular terms. There are two approaches that one
might take here. On the one hand, one might look for a general account of the
indeterminacy operator that will give the truth conditions for sentences of the form
"V S". Truth conditions for sentences of the form "V aPb" will then follow as a
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special instance of this general account. On the other hand, one might think that
what is needed is an account of parthood, i.e. in order to understand why it might
be indeterminate whether one object is part of another a proper understanding of
the parthood relation is needed. Friends of the epistemic and the linguistic views
adopt the former strategy, I shall go for the latter.
2. What form an analysis of parthood for material objects takes depends on the
underlying conception of material objects. To see this it is instructive to begin by
looking at a view of material objects such as Quine's. According to Quine, a
material object is just the material content of a region of space-time, 5 2 and on this
view parthood on material objects reduces to parthood on regions of space-time:
one object is part of another just in case the region of space-time that the first
occupies is included in the region of space-time that the latter occupies. This
suggests something like the following principle as an account of the parthood
relation on material objects:
(Q) Vxy (xPy iff the region of space-time occupied by x is part of the
region of space-time occupied by y).
If we also accept the thesis, which I think is reasonable, that regions of space are
precise, then it follows that the only possibility for parthood to be vague is that there
be objects of which it is indeterminate which region they occupy. Perhaps quantum
52 This is only a generic view, not a precise thesis. Quine has not told us how small a
material object can be and, more fundamentally, he has not told us how to individuate
regions of space-time. But the details need not concern us here. Some of the relevant
questions are taken up in Richard Cartwright's "Scattered objects". The paper first appeared
in Analysis and Metaphysics, (Keith Lehrer ed., Dordrecht 1975) but is reprinted in his
Philosophical Essays, (MIT Press 1987).
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mechanics tells us that there are such objects, but whichever explanation of
vagueness is appropriate in the context of subatomic particles such an explanation
does not help us explain why the sentence "Sparky is part of Kilimanjaro" is vague.
We can, therefore, conclude that as long as we are concerned with ordinary material
objects Quine's view of material objects requires that parthood is precise and
whatever vagueness we encounter must be explained in either linguistic or
epistemic terms.
Quine's view of material objects is simple, and for that reason some find it
attractive. But if simplicity is our motivation, there is yet a simpler view that might
tempt us. This is the view we get if we cut Quine's view down to three dimensional
space. On the resulting view objects are said to be the material content of regions of
space instead of space-time. In other words, material objects are three dimensional
occupiers of space instead of four dimensional occupiers of space-time. But this
view has certain problems. One problem is what David Lewis calls 'the problem of
temporary intrinsics'.
Persisting things change their intrinsic properties. For instance shape: when I sit, I
have a bent shape; when I stand, I have a straightened shape. Both shapes are
temporary intrinsic properties; I have them only some of the time.53
To explain how a change from having a bent shape to having a straightened shape is
possible is the problem of temporary intrinsics. Lewis's favored solution to this
problem is to bring in the fourth dimension, i.e. make time a defining constituent of
material objects. And this gives us back Quine's view. The solution seems artificial
to some, others find it natural, but there is no doubt that it does solve the problem.
53 David K. Lewis, On the Plurality of Worlds, Blackwell 1986, pp. 203-204.
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However, the resulting view, i.e. Quine's, has still nothing to say about modal
properties of objects; it does not offer anything to bear on the most mundane modal
questions such as: Could this statue survive a replacement of a small part? Could
this quantity of water survive a replacement of a part?
Quine's response to this latter problem is well known, he simply denies that
quantified modal logic makes any sense.54 And in so far as it is a solution, it is
effective even if not attractive. But there are also different responses in the
literature. Just as David Lewis solved the problem of temporary intrinsics by making
the temporal dimension a defining constituent of material objects, some
philosophers have suggested that the present problem could be solved by making
possible worlds a defining constituent of material objects.55 The idea is that a
material object is not identified with the material content of a four dimensional
- space-time region but the material content of a five dimensional space-time-world
region. 56 If this idea makes sense, which I am not sure it does, it follows that we can
answer questions such as: Could this statue survive a replacement of parts? But the
answer depends on how we establish the cross-world identification and what limits
there are on which cross-world regions count as statues. 57
54 Some of his reasons are mentioned in section 3 of this chapter where I compare quantified
modal logic to quantified logic of vagueness.
5' See for instance Vann McGee," 'Kilimanjaro' ".
56 pointed out certain difficulties for this view in chapter 2, section 3.
57 If there is no limit on which cross-world regions count as objects then whenever we have a
statue there is at least one statue like thing that does survive a replacement of a small part and
another statue like thing that does not survive such a replacement. The demonstrative 'This
statue' will be vague in such a way that the question: Does this statue survive a replacement
of a small part? will have to be answered by: It depends on which statue like object it is that
you are referring to.
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The number of cross-world regions that are statue like objects might be cut down
in two ways. First, by reference to some principle about which cross-world regions
count as objects and, second, by some principle about language. Let's look briefly at
these. The first option, to postulate some restrictions on which cross-world regions
count as objects, requires restrictions on the notion of composition. Friends of five
dimensional objects sometimes say that objects are mereological sums of time-world
slices, and since each time-world slice is a mereological atom, there does not seem to
be any reason why some atoms have a sum while others do not. This means that
from the point of view of friends of five dimensional objects, the first option is
counter intuitive.
The second option is to answer modal question by reference to sonle principle
about language. We can call this 'the linguistic view of modalities'. On this view, it
will be a feature of the word 'statue' that it picks out an object that is a statue in this
world and also a statue in all other possible worlds where it exists. Supposing that
Alfred is a statue, we might still ask: Might Alfred have been an elephant? The
intuitive answer is negative, and on the linguistic view this is explained by reference
to a feature of the word 'statue', namely that whatever it applies to in this world is a
statue in any other possible world where it exists. But to decide modal questions by
reference to language has certain problems. A friend of the linguistic view of
modalities would like to say something like this: "We might, of course, have had a
different world, 'statphant', that applied to an object just in case it is a statue in this
world and an elephant in other possible worlds." But, on the linguistic view of
modalities as I described it above, this is inconsistent. To say of a that it is a statue in
the actual world but an elephant in w is inconsistent since it will be analytic that a is
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a statue in the actual world just in case it is a statue in all worlds where it exists.
What friends of the linguistic theory of modalities have to say is that a statphant
overlaps a statue in this world but overlaps an elephant in all other worlds where it
exists. 58
Let's assume that friends of the linguistic view can answer such question as
"Could Alfred have been an elephant like object?" in accordance to our intuitions.
But there are other and more mundane modal questions that make problem for the
linguistic view of modalities. Everyone should agree that Alfred survives
replacement of some parts but not others, i.e. some parts of Alfred are contingent
while others are essential. This means that
Alfred has an essential part,
is true. Suppose B is an essential part of Alfred. Then the sentence
B is part of Alfred,
ought not only be true but necessarily true. But on the linguistic view of modalities
the notion of necessity is just the notion of analyticity, which means that the
sentence "B is part of Alfred" should be analytic. But that is hard to make out even
38 One question for the linguistic view of modalities is this: How do we know that our word
'statue' means statue rather than statphant? Since the only statue like objects we encounter
exist at the actual world, we cannot distinguish the two in terms of observable evidence. But
this question may be answered by consulting intuition about modalities. Suppose we have a
statue like object in front of us. If it is a statphant then the sentence "Had I worn my sneakers
today instead of sandals, then this would have been an elephant like object" is true. But it is
not true. However, there is more explaining to do and it is not clear that the linguistic view of
modalities can accommodate this. We must explain why we have the intuition that it is not
true that had I worn sneakers today there would have been an elepant like object in front of
me. The explanation of this is simply that what footwear I have on does not alter the world in
any significant ways, in particular it does not have any impact on the statue like objects that
are in my vicinity. But this explanation is non-linguistic.
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on a description theory of names. Suppose the name 'B' is a short for the description
'the portion of clay which consists of such and such atoms'. From the sentence "B is
the portion of clay that consists of such and such atoms" it does not follow that it B
is part of Alfred. What is needed is that the name 'Alfred' is short for 'the statue
that consists of such and such atoms'. But on a description theory of names we
could have 'B' be a short for the description 'the portion of clay that consists of such
and such atoms' and 'Alfred' be short for the description 'the statue on the table'.5 9
But then it is not analytic that B is part of Alfred.
3. Suppose we give up a Quinean view about material objects. What should we
then say about (Q) as an analysis of parthood.
(Q) Vxy (xPy iff the region of space-time occupied by x is part of the
region of space-time occupied by y).
Principle (Q) presupposes that material objects are four dimensional, i.e. occupiers
of space-time but once we give up the Quinean view this presupposition becomes
questionable. There is a simpler principle that retains the basic idea about parthood
from (Q) but which is indifferent to whether objects are three or four dimensional.
This is the following principle about parthood at a time.
(P) Vxy (xPy at t iff the region of space occupied by x at t is part of the
region of space occuFped by y at t).
59 A different problem for the view under consideration has to do with quantification.
Suppose that Alfred is a statue. Then there is something the replacement of which Alfred
won't survive, i.e.
Bx necessary xP(Alfred)
ought to be true. But if necessity is analyticity, then quantification into modal contexts won't
be legitimate. This is a point that Quine has repeatedly pressed.
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This principle may very well be true, but if what we are after is an analysis of
parthood then there is a problem with (P), namely that if our conception of material
objects isn't analyzable in terms of spatial occupancy, then (P) won't serve as an
analysis of parthood. The best way to see this is to notice that which region of space
an object occupies might depend on what its parts are, rather than the other way
around. This is not to suggest that (P) is false, rather that facts about spatial
extension are not among the primitive facts that determine parthood. In other
words (P) may be extensionally correct, but it isn't informative in the way an
analysis ought to be informative.
4. In order to arrive at an analysis of parthood we should look at ordinary objects
and ordinary claims about their parts. In adopting this strategy we are
presupposing that ordinary objects, mountains, clouds, bodies, etc. are properly
instances of the kind 'material object' and this is not an unchallenged assumption;
van Inwagen says that the only material objects are living organisms and Peter
Unger has not been shy about concluding that even he himself does not exist.6 0 But
such views are hard to defend. If we are told that someone has shown that we are
almost always wrong about the extension of some firmly entrenched word or
phrase, in this case 'material object', we might reply that the person probably
misunderstood the word when arriving at this incredible conclusion. Or to put it a
bit differently, it seems to be a condition on any analysis of the meaning of a word
60 Peter van Inwagen, Material Beings, Cornell University press, 1990, and Peter Unger, "I do
not exist", Perception and Identity, G.F. MacDonald ed., MacMillan Press 1979, reprinted in
Material Constitution: A Reader, Michael C. Rea ed., Rowman & Littlefield 1997.
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that it should preserve some of the fundamental intuitions that we associate with it,
i.e. if an analysis requires too radical a revision, then it is probably wrong. 61
Now, let's look at some ordinary clainms about parthood and see what we can
glean from them. Take an example of a living organism, say my body, and some
basic entities such as cells, atoms and subatomic particles. All agree that a cell that
is inside my left leg is part of me, and it should also be agreed that a cosmic ray that
travels through my leg isn't part of me at any time. But what about things that are
smaller than cells but larger than cosmic rays, say hydrogen atoms? A hydrogen
atom that is inside my leg will, other things being equal, be part of me. Such an
atom might be part of some water molecule that is caught up in various
physiological processes that are among the processes in virtue of which I am a living
organism. But suppose such an atom travels through my leg like a cosmic ray. Is it
.art of me for the moment it is inside my leg? It doesn't seem to be part of me any
more than the cosmic ray. So, we could have two hydrogen atoms, both inside my
left leg at the same time, and one was part of me while the other wasn't. Why is this
so? What can account for the different status of these two hydrogen atoms? Facts
about location are not going to help, since both atoms are located inside my leg at
some moment, they might even be inside the same cell. The difference seems to be
that one atom is caught up in various causal processes that are definitely part of
61 This principle is not immune to challenge. If it were, we would have an answer to radical
skepticism, which I don't think we have. (See for instance C.B. Martin, "The new
Cartesianism" Pacific Phlilosophical Quarterly, 1986) It is rather a maxim about interpretation,
and it should not be given up unless the reasons for doing so are forced on us. But I don't
think that van Inwagen's or Peter Unger's reasons are forced on us. So, the conclusion, at this
point at least, is that we should go on and assume that at least some of the things that we
thought were paradigm cases of material objects are in fact material objects.
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what makes my body a living organism while the other atom doesn't have anything
to do with such processes. It is causally irrelevant as far as my existence goes. But
why should it matter how it is caught up in various causal processes? The answer is
that that's how people are; people are complex bodies of basic elements that are so
causally related that the product is a living thing.
If we are right to say that an atom is part of me because it is caught up in
certain causal processes, then its being part of me is explained by what kind of being
I am and how the atom is caught up in various causal processes. This supports the
basic thesis that facts about parthood are not primitive. But the above example does
more than support the basic thesis, it is suggestive about what particular facts are
relevant for determining parthood in the case of living organisms: If a is part of b
then what determines that a is part of b are (i) facts about what kind of an object b is,
aind (ii) how a is causally related to b. Different material objects, houses, clouds and
mountains, are also bodies of basic elements that are causally related in their own
way. But the causal relations that are important in the case of people are different
from those that are important when it comes to houses, clouds or mountains.
It is fairly clear that there are intricate causal relations that hold between the
basic parts of living organisms in virtue of which these parts make up a living
organism. Even in the cases of many artifacts, for instance houses, it is clear that
there are basic parts that have to be causally related in certain ways in order for
there to be a house; the bricks, if it is a brick house, have to be stuck together, the
walls must support the roof and so on. Otherwise we just have a heap of building
materials instead of a house. But is the same true of mountains and clouds? I think
it is, although the causal relations are simpler and perhaps not as well defined as in
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the case of artifacts and living organisms. In order for clods of earth to make up a
mountain they have to be stuck together, they have to be impenetrable to a certain
degree and they have to form a certain shape. It is in virtue of the shape that we
distinguish mountains from the flatlands, and it is in virtue of the forces between
the parts that we distinguish mountains from clouds of dirt.
5. Now we get to the notion of determination. We need to get a grip on how to
characterize this notion and, then, we need to explain under what circumstances the
primitive facts may fail to determine of some two objects whether one is part of the
other.
A proposition that says of some object a that it is part of some other object b,
might be true, false or indeterminate. If r is a set of propositions describing the
orimitive facts on which parthood depends, then (i) if "aPb" is a consequence of F
then "aPb" is determinately true, and (ii) if the negation of "aPb" is a consequence of
r then "aPb" is determinately false. Finally, (iii) if there is no appropriate set r such
that either "aPb" or its negation is a consequence of r then "aPb" is indeterminate.
In this respect the relevant notion of determination is just the notion of logical
consequence.
But what propositions should be in F? What makes r appropriate? In keeping
with what I said earlier the set r should contain propositions describing two aspects
of the objects in question. (i) Propositions about what kind of object b is, for
instance, "b is a human body", or "b is a living organism". An object may belong to
more than one kind, some particular human will, for instance, not only belong to the
kind 'human' but also to the kinds 'animal' and 'living organism'. I shall use the
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variables 'k ' 'k2b', 'k3b' etc. to range over propositions describing such facts. (ii) r
should contain propositions describing how a is causally related to b, propositions
about some other contingent relations such as "a is inside b", or "a is attached to b"
and other propositions describing the nature of such an attachment in more details
as the case might be. I shall use the variables 'cl', ... , 'ck' to range over propositions
describing such facts. But this is not enough. These propositions do not say
anything about parthood and, therefore, nothing about parthood will follow from
them. So, r should also contain (iii) whatever general principles about parthood
that hold of objects falling under the kinds in question, such as: "cells are among the
parts of human bodies", "Cosmic rays are not parts of human bodies" and "If an
object is causally related to an object of kind k in such-and-such a way then it is part
of that object". I will use the variables 'gl', .. , 'g,' to range over such general
principles.
But there is no reason to believe that all facts about parthood are determined
directly by the primitive facts, i.e. there might be facts about parthood that are
determined only because some other facts about parthood are determined. It might
be determined that d is part of e, but indeterminate whether c is part of d. Still, it
will be determined that if c is part of d then it is part of e. For this reason, r should
also contain whatever facts about parthood that are determined independently of
whether a is part of b. I shall use the variables 'f', ..., 'fir' to range over propositions
describing such facts.
The idea now is that if it is determinate that a is (not) part of b, then there should
be a sound derivation of the form:
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a is (not) part of b
When such a derivation is available I shall say that it is determinate that a is (not)
part of b, or that a is a determinate (non-) part of b. I will call this kind of
determination normic determination, (ND) for short. 62
Now that we have an analysis of parthood we can say more precisely what it
is for parthood to be vague: parthood is vague when it is not determinate in the
sense of the (ND) schema, either directly or indirectly. In other words, if it isn't
determinate in the sense of the (ND) schema of some object a that it either is or isn't
part of some other object b, then it is indeterminate whether a is part of b. This gives
us the following indeterminacy principle:
Indeterminacy Principle: VxVy (V xPy iff -- 3r ( xPy v r [- xPy)).
The Indeterminacy Principle presupposes that indeterminacy contexts are
referentially transparent. This contrasts with the linguistic view according to which
such contexts are not transparent.6 3
6. Now that we have nity thesis about parthood spelled out in abstract terms, a
concrete example will help us get a better feel for it. Suppose we want to know
62 The term 'normic' comes from Michael Scriven's "Truism as a ground for historical
explanation" Theories of History, P. Gardiner ed., The Free Press 1959.
63 I discussed the difference between the ontological and the linguistic proposal in this
respect in some detail in Chapter Three.
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whether a certain hair, call it 'Harry', is part of the cat Tibbles. First, we might
notice that Tibbles' fur is definitely part of Tibbles, i.e.
fi = Tibbles' fur is part of Tibbles.
The question now becomes whether Harry is part of Tibbles' fur. We have the
general principles that a hair that is attached in the appropriate way to a fur (i.e. is
not just glued onto it or stuck in chewing gum etc.) is part of the fur, and a hair that
is not attached to a fur is not part of the fur, i.e.
gl = A hair is part of a fur iff it is appropriately attached to the fur.
What would need spelling out is what 'appropriately attached to the fur' amounts
to. Suppose that for a hair to be appropriately attached to a fur it is sufficient for it
to bear relation R to the fur and necessary for it to bear the relation Q to the fur.
Now, although we have a sufficient and a necessary condition for appropriate
attachment, these conditions need not be jointly exhaustive, i.e. a hair may satisfy
the necessary condition but not the sufficient condition. And assuming that Harry is
such a hair, we will not have any premiss saying that Harry either is or isn't
appropriately attached to the fur.
And, suppose further that there isn't anything else that might settle the issue
whether Harry is part of Tibbles' fur, then it does not follow that Harry is part of the
fur, nor does it follow that Harry is not part of the fur. And since the only way for
Harry to be part of Tibbles is for it to be part of Tibbles' fur, it is indeterminate
whether Harry is part of Tibbles. In this example, it is directly indeterminate
whether Harry is part of the fur, but only indirectly indeterminate whether Harry is
part of Tibbles.
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7. So far my examples have involved parts of li ring organisms, and it seems that
these, along with artifacts, are the material objects that best suit my purposes. There
is a natural way for a hair to be attached to the fur of a cat, namely to be in the
socket from which it grew, and so we might say that the hair is a natural part of the
cat. Similarly, there is a natural way for a leg of a chair to be part of the chair and an
arm of a statue to be a part of the statue. Of course there is difference between
organisms and artifacts in this respect; the way in which it is natural for artifacts to
have certain of their parts isn't a matter of natural law but, perhaps, a matter of
convention or the intention of the maker. But despite this difference we can, in both
cases, make a distinction between a contingent part and an accidental part.
Contingent parts of Tibbles are the hairs that are parts of the fur, the tail, the legs,
and so on. These are parts that are not essential but we expect a cat to have them
cr,d we can, perhaps, explain why a particular cat has these parts by reference to
some underlying nature. Such a nature might be given by the genetic makeup of the
cat. Among the accidental parts of Tibbles are the atoms that make up Tibbles.
These are accidental since there is nothing specific about Tibbles that explains why
those atoms are parts of him rather than some other atoms. The reason why some
atoms are parts of Tibbles while some other atoms are not is just that those atoms
were in a particular location at a particular time, say in Tibbles' food a week ago.
But do mountains, for instance, have any natural parts? Perhaps the peak is such
a part, if the mountain has one, and the slopes also. But once we get down to
smaller things, such as pebbles and grains of sand, these will only be accidental
parts of any mountain.
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8. Determination of parthood along the lines that I have been suggesting
resembles Hempel's model for deductive-nomological explanation (D-N for short).
But there are important differences between the two models. First, instead of
general laws and bridge laws in the D-N model, we have propositions which
describe kinds ('klb', 'k 2b') and general principles true in virtue of the nature of the
members of the kinds in question ('gl',. . , 'g,'); and second, in a D-N explanation
the conclusion follows by standard first order logic from the premisses but in the
(ND) schema the derivation of the conclusion is not as straight forward, as I will
explain below. So, what a normic determination of parthood comes to in the end
depends on what our notion of kind is, what general principles about parthood are
available, and what the appropriate logic for the (ND) schema is.
2. Kinds and general principles
1. My account of parthood requires that objects belong to kinds and that there be
certain general principles true of members of those kinds. But talk about kinds is
often viewed with suspicion and prompts resistance from philosophers with
nominalistic leanings. I believe, however, that such resistance is unwarranted in the
present context.64 In our daily practices we do distinguish between all kinds of
64 We can even construe the notion of a kind in a purely nominalistic way along the lines of
Sylvain Bromberger. The basic notion in Bromberger's account is that of a model. It is
defined as follows:
M is a model of O relative to a quadruple <Qm, Q., P, A> iff (a) M and 0 are numerically
distinct, (b) in that quadruple Qm is a non-empty set of questions about M, Q, is a non-
empty set of questions about 0, P pairs members of Qm with members of Q, and A is an
algorithm that translates answers to any member of Q,,. into answers to the members of Q,,
paired with it by P., and translates correct answers to the former into correct answers to the
latter.
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objects; there are kinds of stuff, for instance metals and minerals, and there are kinds
of living things, for instance plants and animals, and so on. This is ought to be
unproblematic. Then come the philosophers who, in order to make things more
systematic, distinguish between kinds and natural kinds or real kinds and so on.
From the present point of view, where our concern is parthood rather than
metaphysics of kinds, we need not make these philosophical moves. Perhaps it is
indeterminate to a greater extent what the parts of instances of the mundane kinds,
such as mountains, are than what the parts of, say, cats are. But that is just as we
should expect things to be, intuitively it is indeterminate to a greater extent what the
parts of Kilimanjaro are than what the parts of the cat Tibbles are. However, from
the point of view of the (ND) schema the two kinds, mountain and cat, have the
same role; all we need a notion of kind for is to yield certain general principles about
parthooi and, it seems, a notion of kind can do that without committing us to a
certain metaphysical view about kinds. There are books in the library, and they are
of a different kind from the shelves, and it is in general true of books that they have
such parts as pages and spines. Similarly, there are chickens in the hut, and
chickens and huts are of different kinds, and it is generally true that among the parts
of chickens are wings and among the parts of huts are roofs.
When members of Qm are paired only with members of Q,, with which they are identical
except for the replacement of reference to M by reference to O and the answers to each
question are identical except for similar replacement of reference, theln M is an exact model of
C. This notion of exact model then serves to define first what he calls minimal natural kind
and, then, quasi natural kind. Finally, Bromberger arrives at a notion of a biological kind by
identifying a subset of the kind that is a quasi-natural kind and closing the set under the
descendant relation. ("Natural kinds and questions", Poznan Stiudies in the Plilosoph)y of the
Sciences and the Humranities, Vol. 51 1997.)
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2. I have been suggesting that the notion of a kind that we need for the (ND)
schema is just the common sense notion of a kind that ought to be uncontroversial.
But one might worry that this treatment of kinds only transfers whatever problerm3
one might have with kinds over to the general principles that the kinds yield. More
specifically, someone might agree that a notion of a kind can yield certain general
principles about members of kinds and that such principles are constitutive of our
understanding of parthood, but maintain that (i) if the notion of a kind is reduced to
common sense then so must the general principles and (ii) such general principles
are not exceptionless and, therefore, do not have the entailment properties that the
(ND) schema requires them to have.
To make the worry clearer consider the kind 'chicken' and the general
principle 'chickens have wings'. The assumption that there is such a kind should be
unproblematic, and the general principle seems to be an appropriate generalization
about the members of this kind. The question now is: What logical properties does
this principle have? When a principle such as "Chickens have wings" figures in a
scientific explanation (for instance in a D-N model) we treat it either as a universal
generalization, "All chickens have wings" or as a statistical generalization, "Most
chickens have wings". But construing the generalization in either of those ways in
the context of the (ND) schema is going to be problematic. On the one hand, if it is a
universal generalization then it is proven false by Chanticlear who is a chicken but
was born without wings. On the other hand, if it is a probabilistic generalization it
may be true, but then it won't follow that any particular chicken, for instance
Chanticlear, either has or does not have wings.
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Since we do not reject the principle "Chickens have wings" in the light of the
fact that Chanticlear was born without wings - we say that he is an exception to the
principle - we can not say that the principle is a universal generalization. And since
we want to be able to draw inferences from it about particular chickens, we can not
say that the principle is a statistical generalization. An alternative reading is
needed. The required reading is no new reading, we find it, for instance, in
Aristotle's discussion of causal generalizations. 6 5 Aristotle distinguished three
varieties of causes. First, there are causes that produce certain effects invariably and
of necessity, second, those which produce certain effects for the most part (epi to polu
as he said), and third, those that produce certain effects by chance. According to
Aristotle, natural causes, as opposed to celestial ones, fall in the second category, i.e.
produce their effects for the most part. But how are we to understand such causal
generolizations, say the generalizations that rhubarb purge or that malathion kil.!;
weeds, if not as either universal or statistical generalizations. Here is a brief
description of Aristotle's account of causal generalizations:
For Aristotle, A and B are connected as cause and effect - so that we may assert the
general truth that A's cause B's - just when A in a given set of prerequisite
conditions [...] invariably produces B, "unless something prevents". This means
that the epi to polui character of the relationship of A's as cause to B's as effect has to
do with the possibility of A's causal efficacy [...] being interfered with.66
h5 Here I follow Mikael M. Karlsson's "Defeating the inference from general to particular
norms", (Ratio Juris, Vol. 8, No, 3 1995) who draws, in part, on Michael Scriven's "Truism as a
ground for historical explanations" (Theories of History, Patrick (;ardiner ed., The Free Press
1959).
66 "Defeating the inference from general to particular norms", p. 279. Notice that there is
nothing contradictory about the causal efficacy's being interfered with in many or even the
majority of cases.
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This account of generalizations isn't clearly incompatible with treating causal
generalizations as universal generalizations and the inferences to particular cases as
universal instantiation, for although such a generalization could not be of the form
"All A's are B's" it might have an unless clause, i.e. it might look like "All A's are B's
unless this-or-that is the case". The question then is how the 'unless' clause might
be completed, i.e. what might interfere with the causal efficacy.
[Aristotle's] answer is: any number of things; and which things they are is in general
a question which is open-ended; while we can perhaps enumerate a variety of
interfering causes, no complete enumeration is possible.6 7
If the list is truly open-ended then the hope for treating the causal generalizations as
standard first order universal generalizations with an 'unless' clause become bleak
because the 'unless' clause itself would have to be open-ended. That, however, does
rnot make it impossible to give a formal account of the consequence relation, it only
makes attempts to do it in the standard way hopeless. The appropriate logic for the
(ND) schema might be either default logic or infinitary logic. In the first case the
general principles would be treated as what are called 'defaults'. A default is a rule
of inference of the form: "If x is an A and it is consistent to infer that x is a B, then x
is a B". I say more about default logic below. Alternatively, we might allow infinite
67 "Defeating the inference from general to particular norms", p. 279. Karlsson then says that
if the list is truly open-ended then the probabilistic reading will be hopeless since there will,
in general, be no definite relation of probability that the A's have in relation to the B's. He is
right that the probabilistic reading is hopeless but that the list is open ended is not enough to
make it hopeless. The list of natural numbers is open ended but there is still a definite
relation of probability for picking a pair of odd numbers to picking a pair of even numbers
when picking numbers at random. There is, however, no definite relation of probability for
picking a pair of odd numbers to a pair of prime numbers. What is needed in addition to the
open endedness to make a probabilistic reading hopeless is a certain irregularity and the list
of interfering factors is irregular in the required way.
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disjunctions and formulate the general principles as "All As are Bs, unless ..." where
the unless clause is allowed to be infinitely long. In either case the general
principles that figure in the (ND) schema will have the required logical properties. 6 8
4. If the generalizations that figure in the (ND) schema are defaults, one might
wonder what makes them truth-preserving, and if they are universal generalizations
with an infinite unless clause, one might wonder what makes them true. Similar
questions arises with respect to causal generalizations that admit of exceptions.
Let's first look at why causal generalizations are truth preserving or true, and then
come back to generalizations about parthood.
When causal generalizations are true, it is in virtue of certain causal
mechanisms that they are true, and it is in virtue of those same mechanisms that we
are licensed to draw certain inferences. And when our inferences fail it is not
because we were mistaken about the causal mechanisms but because there are some
interfering factors that prevented the mechanism from working properly. If we
understand general principles about causality in this way then we can maintain (i)
that they are true or false, (ii) that from such a principle that is true, say the principle
that malathion kills weeds, one can infer that weeds sprayed with malathion will
68 The present issue is to explain when one thing is part of some other thing, but there is a
related issue that is worth distinguishing from the present one, namely what is needed in
order to answer the question: "Why is this part of that?" In order to answer the why question
we only need what has been called 'abnormic law'. An abnormic law is of the form "All As
are Bs unless so-and-so" where the 'so-and-so' is replaced by a description of some relevant
or common exceptions to the unqualified claim that all As are Bs. See Sylvain Bromberger,
()n What Twe Know we don't Know, University of Chicago Press 1992.
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die, and (iii) that a particular weed sprayed with malathion that does not die does
not prove the principle false.69
So, we have a reading of general principles about causality that have the
logical properties that we want general principles about parthood to have. But
general truths about causality are quite different from general principles about
parthood and one might worry whether the above reading of the former can also
apply to the latter. I think it can. When a generalization such as "chickens have
wings" is true, it is so not in virtue of some underlying causal mechanism but in
virtue of a characteristic of chickens.
["chickens have wings"] may be meant as a truth about a characteristic of chickens
- something that relates to what it is to be a chicken. This is not a defining
characteristic, since a wingless thing may, after all, be a chicken. Rather it tells us
how we may expect a chicken to be; and why may we have such an expectation?
Because there is something about'being chicken - about the chicken nature, if you
like [...] that produces wings, albeit epi to poli, or subject to interference. 7s
Suppose we have a general principle G that says that As are Bs. We assume that this
principle is true, but we are also allowing that it has exceptions. If we take G to be a
universal generalization our question is: Why is it true? Since G has an infinite
unless clause it might be trivially true because any putative counterexample could
be taken care of by assuming that the relevant constraints are included in the unless
clause. If it is not trivially true, but true nevertheless, the answer is more intricate.
We can't say it is true because all As are Bs, for that is not right, nor can we say it is
69 It is interesting to compare this account of general causal propositions to Wittgenstein's
remarks on movements of machines in §§ 193-194 of Plilosophical lnvtestigations.
70 "Defeating the inference from general to particular norms", p. 281.
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true because all As are Bs unless such and such is the case, since that is just to say
that G is true because G is true. Instead, we say that G should be understood as
saying something about a characteristic of As. If it is true, it is so because As have
this characteristic. If we understand G as a default, our question is: Why is G truth
preserving? We explain the legitimacy of the inference from something's being an A
to its being a B by reference to a characteristic of the As, namely that they are Bs
unless something interferes.
But what is a characteristic? This question is not trivial. Suppose G says that
chickens are winged animals. Now, if we consider a single chicken such as
Chanticlear, it is clear that it is not a characteristic of him that he is a winged animal.
Someone might suggest that in the present context characteristics are best
understood as dispositions, past or present. The suggestion might thein be that
although Chanticlear does not have wings, nor a disposition to grow an, at an early
stage in the development of the chicken something had a disposition to become a
winged bird although that disposition was never manifest. To explain what
characteristics are by reference to past or present dispositions may be appropriate in
many cases but it won't work as a general account of characteristics. Chanticlear
may, for instance, by wingless due to some genetic mutation in which case !t no
point in the development of the bird was there anything that had a disposition to
grow wings. Instead, we must understand talk about characteristics as normative
talk about kinds of things. When we say that being winged is a characteristic of
chickens we predicate it of the species, and it applies to individual chickens only
indirectly.
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If it is open to us to have general principles about parthood that are (i) true or
false, (ii) license inferences to particular cases and (iii) admit of exceptions, then
there should be no formal or logical problem with the (ND) schema. Moreover, if
we think that the facts that are relevant for determining parthood are facts about
kinds of objects, characteristics of objects falling under certain kinds and facts about
contingent relations, such as causal relations, then the (ND) schema should seem at
least plausible as an account of parthood for material objects. But the price one has
to pay for such an account of parthood is a commitment to characteristics or natures
of things.
3. Three worries
1. There are three worries that someone might have about my account of
parthood that I will now address. The first has to do with the status of the general
principles, the second worry is that my account won't give the intuitive conclusion
when the parts are strange or unexpected in certain ways, and the third is that the
explanation of vagueness given by the (ND) schema is linguistic rather than
ontological.
The first worry derives from the analogy between my (ND) schema and the D-
N model for scientific explanations. One problem for the D-N model has to do with
the status of the bridge laws, and the similarities between such explanations and my
(ND) schema might suggest that there was a similar problem with the latter. The
problem for the D-N model is that the bridge laws in D-N explanations are intended
only to connect two vocabularies, say a vocabulary of elementary physics and a
vocabulary used to represent certain observations, but they actually carry with them
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theoretical commitments. The bridge laws are not scientifically innocent, or at least
not as innocent as friends of D-N explanations wanted them to be. A similar worry
might arise with respect to the general principles that figure in my (ND) schema.
The worry would be that since a principle like "Chickens have wings" is neither
analytic nor a defining principle about chickens, it brings with it empirical weight,
i.e. it has the status of a scientific law. This means that the principle is not a priori
and our account of, say, which entities are parts of Chanticlear might be false.
This worry is unfounded because the role of the general principles in my (ND)
schema is quite different form the role of bridge laws in a D-N model. The role of
the general principles in my schema is not just to connect two vocabularies but to
tell us something about the way the world is. The principle that chickens have
wings isn't just a principle about the general noun 'chicken' but an empirical
principle about what chickens in general are like. And as any empirical principle it
is fallible. This, however, does not mean that the account of parthood is misguided.
A comparison with the linguistic explanation of vagueness might make this
clearer. The linguistic view maintains that facts about thoughts and practices of
speakers determine meaning. But any account of what determines, say, the
extension of the predicate 'bald' will have to take into account all sorts of fallible
empirical evidence. But that is not a reason to doubt the general account of what
facts determine meaning nor is it a reason to question the linguistic explanation of
vagueness.7 1 Similarly, the general account of parthood in terms of which the
71 I'm not saying that there is no reason to question the linguistic explanation of vagueness,
only that this is not a reason for questioning it.
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ontological view is spelled out is not subject to doubt simply because any particular
claim about the parts of some particular chicken is fallible.
2. The second worry is this: The schema may conform to our intuitions as long
as we are considering ordinary parts such as arms of people and hairs of cats, but it
won't do well when we imagine fantasy worlds where creatures have unusual parts.
Take for instance Ursula LeGuin's story about the Catwings.7 - The Cat-wings were a
family of winged cats and the story made it clear that no other cats before or since
had wings. Had the story not been a fiction, there would have been cats that had
wings as parts. The question now is whether this can be accommodated by the (ND)
schema. One thing that can certainly not be appealed to is the general principle
"Cats have wings" since it is plainly false.
I think the (ND) schema can handle this case without any modification. The
thing to notice is that the Catwings fall under other kinds than just 'cat'. They are
also mammals, animals and living organisms. Now, the wings were not just
strapped to the cats by some rubber strings, they were attached to the cats' bodies
very much like their feet and tail. There were veins extending from the body into
the wings, there were muscles that were attached to bones in the wings and also to
bones in the body of the cats, and so on. Now we can appeal to a principle that says
that an entity that is attached to a living organism in this way is part of that
organism. And since the members of the Catwings family are living organisms
then, given the principle about parts of living organisms, it follows that the wings
72 The example comes from Vann McGee. The story is serialized in the children's magazine
Spider.
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are parts of the cats. We might say that the wings are parts of the Catwings not
because they are cats, but because they are living organisms.
Similarly, if I were to start to grow wings one day, it would not be because I am a
human being that these wings would be parts of me, but because I am a living
organism, and an outgrowth from a living organism that is sustained by the
functioning of the organism, is part of that organism. That's how living organisms
are.
3. The third worry is that the explanation of vagueness that we get from the (ND)
schema is, in the end, linguistic rather than ontological. Vague parthood is
explained in terms of failure of logical consequence, i.e. when neither 'aPb' nor
'-,aiPb' is a consequence of a certain set of premisses, then it is indeterminate
whether a is part of b. The worry now is this: Whether some object turns out to be
vague, in the above sense, will depend on how it is described or referred to. When I
say that the wings are parts of the Catwings because they are living organisms but
not because they are cats, one might worry that the (ND) schema had the wings be
determinate parts of the Catwings described as living organism but not determinate
parts of them described as cats. This would, indeed, be bad.
This charge is similar to Quine's criticism that quantified modal logic is caught
up in a use-mention confusion, and it is instructive to compare the two. Quine
invites us to consider the following sentences.
A cyclist is necessarily biped.
A mathematician is necessarily rational.
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A mathematician is not necessarily biped.
A cyclist is not necessarily rational.
On modest assumptions about what it is to be biped and rational these are true. But
what are we then to say about someone who is both a cyclist and a mathematician?
Quine's answer is that saying of someone, independently of how he is described,
that he is necessarily one way but only contingently some other way does not make
any sense.
Quine's notion of necessity was the notion of logical truth extended to the
notion of analyticity, and with this notion one cannot make any sense of an open
sentence being nontrivially necessarily true of an object.73 So, for instance, Quine
would not allow a necessity operator appearing inside the scope of a quantifier as in
3x 0 Fx,
except where 'F' is a tautological predicate such as 'is or is not red'. .Similarly, the
linguistic notion of vagueness does not allow the 'V' operator attaching to an openl
formula inside the scope of a quantifier.7 4 But the fundamental claim of my view is
that
(1) 3xy V xPy
is true.
Quine insisted that if one was to make sense of quantified modal logic a
different interpretation of '0' was needed.
73 My account of Quine's criticism of quantified modal logic follows John P. Burgess'
"Quinus ab omni naevo vindicatus" in Meaning and Reference, Ali A. Kazmi ed., Calgary
University Press 1998, pp. 32-33.
74 This is not quite straight forward as I explained in chapter 2.
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... the important point to observe is that granted an understanding of the
modalities (through uncritical acceptance, for the sake of the argument, of the
underlying notion of analyticity) and given an understanding of quantification
ordinarily so called, we do not come out automatically with any meaning for
quantified modal sentences ...75
Quine then added that to save quantified modal logic from the charge of use-
mention confusion one would need Aristotelian essentialism, i.e. one could not just
extend the notions of logical truth and analyticity to make sense of such necessity
but would need something altogether different and, by his lights, unreasonable.7 6
Similarlv, we can't simply extend the linguistic notion of indeterminacy to
make sense of ontological indeterminacy. We need something different. To
continue the analogy with modal logic, we might say that we need something to do
for the notion of ontological indeterminacy what Aristotelian essentialism was to do
for metaphysical necessity before we can have quantified logic of indeterminacy.
Without Aristotelian essentialism quantified modal logic would be mysterious. It
would be a mystery why 'OF' was true of some objects and not others. The role of
essentialism was to remove this mystery, or relocate it as Quine would probably say.
Similarly, without some metaphysical underpinnings quantified logic of vagueness
will be mysterious.
4. But what do we need in order to save quantified logic of vagueness from the
charge of use-mention confusion without ending up in mysteries? Again, a look at
75 "Reference and modality", Front a Logical Point of View, second ed., Harvard University
Press 1961, p. 150.
76 "Reference and modality", second ed., p. 156
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Quine's animadversions on modal logic is helpful.77 Quantified modal logic can
take a form that would not be objectionable by Quine's lights. We can easily
convince ourselves that the following formula is valid:
(2) Vx (Gx A OFx) - OVy (Gy --> Fy).
If 'G' stands for 'is a cyclist' and 'F' stands for 'is biped', then the formula says that if
something is a cyclist and it is analytic that it is biped, then it is analytic that every
cyclist is biped. Similarly, we can convince ourselves that the following is true:
(3) Vx ((Gx A OVy (Gy -- Fy)) -- OFx).
This formula says that if anything x is a cyclist and it is analytic that anything that is
a cyclist is also biped, then it is analytic that x biped. Combining (2) and (3) we get
(4) Vx (Gx - (OFx "-e OVy (Gy - Fy))).
Adding (4) to the list of axioms of our first order predicate logic should be
unobjectionable from the point of view of Quine except that it collapses modal
distinctions altogether and makes quantified modal logic pointless. In order to get
interesting modal logic, modal logic that is worth the trouble, one needs something
different. One thing to do is to have (4) apply selectively to certain 'canonical'
predicates for then, if (i) for each object there is at least one canonical predicate it
satisfies and, (ii) for any two canonical predicates, 'A' and 'B'
(5) 3x (Ax A Bx) - OVy (Ay -4 By),
77 Here I follow John P. Burgess' "Quinus ab omni naevo vindicatus", in particular pp. 34-35.
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is true, then principle (4) could serve as a basis for interesting quantified modal logic.
But how could we select what predicates should be taken to be canonical? John P.
Burgess offers the following answer:
It seems that making the selection [...] would require reviving something like the
ancient and mediaeval notion of 'real definitions' as opposed to 'nominal
definitions' ... (p. 35)
In the context of vagueness, as opposed to modality, the role of 'real
definitions' would be to determine which general principles were admitted into F.
That the principle "Chickens have wings" is an acceptable principle while "Cats
have wings" is not acceptable, is not due to some linguistic or semantic facts. It is
because that's how chickens and cats are. That certain propositions about parthood
turn out to be determinate while others are not, is likewise not a linguistic matter,
but a matter of how certain objects are. But in order to select principles that are
neither arbitrary nor trivial friends of vague objects must take on board the idea that
objects have natures; it is in virtue of the nature of objects that certain principles are
true and certain principles are false.78 So, just as the friends of quantified modal
logic were pushed back to essentialism so are the friends of vague parthood forced
78 What the natures of different things are is not the subject of philosophy. What the nature
of, say, living organisms are is the subject of biology and as long as there is some ignorance
concerning the nature of certain objects, parthood may be epistemically indeterminate.
Perhaps there is no reason to believe that we will ever be able to get complete knowledge of
the nature of organisms, or any object for that matter, and if that is so, there may always be an
element of ignorance surrounding parthood. Moreover, insofar as speakers are ignorant
about parthood it may be impossible for them to fix a definite extension of a parthood
predicate, the result of which would be some linguistic vagueness. But this is in no conflict
with the present view. The present view does not entail that there should be no epistemic or
linguistic vagueness, only that vagueness of parthood is not only, and not primarily, a matter
of imperfect knowledge or semantic indecision.
101
to accept natures of things, which, although unreasonable by Quine's lights, I am
happy to accept.
What makes the present thesis properly a thesis about ontological vagueness as
opposed to linguistic vagueness is not just the failure of logical consequence. The
mere failure of logical consequence makes it a theory about vagueness. What makes
it a theory about ontological vagueness is which general principles are acceptable and
their role in determining facts about parthood.
4. General principles and default logic
1. The idea that default logic might be applicable to account for the consequence
relation in the (ND) schema needs explaining. Default logic has primarily been used
to model common sense reasoning, to describe what one might call epistemically
valid inferences and as a logical basis for artificial intelligence. 7 9 What sets default
logic apart from classical logic is the introduction of new inference rules, called
'defaults', which allow one to draw conclusions that one would otherwise not be
allowed to draw. An example makes this clearer: Suppose we are reasoning about
chickens. We have the rule of thumb that if we have no special reason to doubt that
a particular chicken has wings we can infer that it has wings. Now we introduce a
rule of inference which allows us to infer of any chicken that it has wings unless we
have a reason to believe otherwise. The rule takes the following form:
79 My understanding of default logic derives mainly from Grigoris Antoniou's book,
Nonmonctonic Reasoning (MIT Press 1997).
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I I x has wings
x has wings
where I is a deductively closed set of sentences describing our epistemic status.
The rule reads thus: if for an arbitrary chicken a it is consistent with what we know
that it has wings, then we can infer that it has wings. In other words, if "a has
wings" is consistent with the set n, then we may infer the sentence "a has wings".
But the inference is non-monotonic since some additional information may have the
consequence that we can no longer infer "a has wings". Suppose, for instance, that
all we know about Chanticlear is that he is a chicken and that he lives on this or that
farm, but we don't know anything about whether he has wings or not. Then,
"Chanticlear has wings" will be consistent with our epistemic status, and the default
allows us to conclude that Chanticlear has wings. But suppose we receive a picture
of Chanticlear and learn that he has no wings after all, then we have to take back our
earlier conclusion.
2. This is how default logic has been used, but this needs to be changed once we
apply the idea of defaults to characterize ontological vagueness as opposed to
epistemically valid reasoning.
A default theory T = (n, D), is a pair where n is a deductively closed set of
sentences and D is a set of defaults. The first question we need to ask is: What
sentences should the set n contain? Since our concern is vague parthood as defined
by the (ND) schema, the set n should not describe our epistemic status but instead
whatever can figure as a premiss in the (ND) schema except the general principles.
The general principles will be the members of D.
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But it is not enough to say what the members of H should be, we also need to
know what general properties the resulting default theory has and that depends on
what the defaults are like. In general a default has the form:
Hip
q
and such defaults can behave in strange ways. For instance, q might be the negation
of p in which case the default allows one to infer the negation of the justification for
the inference. But in respect of the (ND) schema we do not have to worry about
such strange defaults. All the defaults will take the form:
flip
p
A default of this form is called 'normal default', and a default eIor wVere all the
defaults are normal is called 'normal default theory'. Such a theory is relatively well
behaved, it is, for instance, almost monotonic, i.e. the following can be proved:
Semi-monotonicity: Let T = (, D) and T' = (I, D') be normal default theories
such that D c D'. Then, each extension of T is contained in an extension of
T'.8°
In a normal default theory the only time one might have to take something
back is when additional information is obtained independently of the defaults as in
the example above, where we learned that Chanticlear had no wings by getting a
picture of him. This is why normal default theories are not monotonic but only
80 See Nonmonotonic Reasoning, p. 50.
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semi-monotonic. But in the case of the (ND) schema, where the initial set of
sentences does not describe our epistemic status but the primitive facts on which
parthood depends, we do not have to worry about such cases. The set of primitive
facts does not expand as we learn more things. It is fixed. The conclusion is,
therefore, that if we treat the (ND) schema as a normal default theory, then it will
not only be semi-monotonic but also monotonic.
Another important feature of normal default theories is that they have an
extension, i.e. in applying the defaults we will reach a point where further
application does not make any difference. However, in normal default theory there
is nothing to prevent us from having a pair of defaults such as the following:
(a) n I p (b) I1 Ip-,
p -,P
But if we have defaults like these, what the extension of the default theory is
depends on which default is applied first, i.e. if we apply (a) first we may be able to
infer p. But then the set FI will be inconsistent with -,p which means that we won't
be able to infer -p. However, if we apply (b) first, we may be able to infer -,p, in
which case we won't be able to infer p. In sum, even in a normal default theory the
extension of the theory may depend on the order in which the defaults are applied.
To make the relevance of order clearer an example from ethics might help.
Suppose we use default theory to model reasoning from the following moral norms.
One should not lie.
One should save life.
We might represent these norms as defaults in the following way:
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F I I do not lie
I do not lie I save life
Suppose that one encounters a situation where saving a life requires lying, i.e. the
conjunction of "I save life" and "I do not lie" is inconsistent with a description of the
circumstances. Now, if I begin by applying the default that tells me not to lie, then I
will have to sacrifice life and the second default becomes inapplicable. However, if I
apply the default that tells me to save life first, then I have to lie, so that the first
default becomes inapplicable. What I end up doing depends then on in what order I
apply the defaults.
A question we now need to ask is whether the extension of the predicate 'P'
may depend on in which order we apply the defaults. There are two cases which
we need to consider. The first is where the consequences of different defaults are
inconsistent as is the case with (a) and (b) above. The second case is like the ethical
case where the consequences are not inconsistent by themselves but HI has a
sentence that is the negation of the conjunction of the consequences of some
defaults. I think it is clear that we do not have to worry about the first case. The
defaults represent what I called earlier general truths or general principles about
parthood, and these do not contradict each other.
The second case is not as clear. Could it be that F included the sentence
"_(aPb A aPc)" and that there were two defaults such that applying one before the
other would allow us to conclude "aPb" but applying the second before the first
would allow us to conclude "aPc"? The question is whether it could be that the only
thing that prevented a from being part of c was that a was part of b, and likewise,
that the only thing that prevented a from being part of b was that a was part of c. I
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n I save life
don't know whether there is any clear answer to this question, but neither is it clear
that much hinges on which way we answer it. If it is possible that the extension
depends on the order of application, we can define a notion of minimal commitment
as the intersection of all the extensions that we get by applying the defaults in
different order and then identify the determinate extension and the determinate
anti-extension of 'P' with the minimal comumitment.81 After all, if it does depend on
the order of application of the defaults whether a is part of b, and if there is no fact of
the matter in which order the defaults should be applied, then it seem right to say
that it is indeterminate whether a is part of b.82
81 It should be noted that the minimal commitment is need not be an extension of a normal
default theory.
82 In the case of parthood it does not seem to be problematic that the order in which the
defaults are applied affects the extension of the theory. The same is not true of the ethical
case described above. In the case of parthood we can make do with the minimal
commitment, i.e. the intersection of the extnesions we get by applying the defaults in
different order. In the moral case we cannot make do with the minimal commitment. The
extension of the default theory in the moral case are sentences describing my actions. The
minimal commitment might have neitehr the sentence "I lie" nor "I sacrifice life", but the




In this chapter I offer an analysis of the notions of vague object and material
constitution. The former is rather straight forward once we have an account of
vague parthood. The basic idea is that vagueness for objects is just vagueness with
respect to parthood. The notion of material constitution turns out to be more
difficult. In section two I turn to the notions of 'partial constitution' and 'exact
constitution' that I mentioned briefly in Chapter Two. Now I give a detailed
definition of them.
1. Vague object
1. From a notion of vague parthood it is relatively easy to get to the notion of
vague object that I am interested in. The basic idea is that if it is indeterminate of
some object whether it is part of another object then the latter object is vague. So, for
instance, if it is indeterminate of some droplet whether it is part of a certain cloud
then the cloud is vague. To capture this one might suggest the following definition:
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An object O is vague relative to entities E at time t iff it is indeterminate of at
least one of the Es whether it is part of O at t.
Although this definition is faithful to the basic idea it does not quite succeed. The
problem is this: Suppose (i) that we have two objects, a and b where a is a fusion of
droplets while b is a cloud. Intuitively, b is vague with respect to some droplets
while a is precise with respect to droplets and larger entities. Suppose further (ii)
that parthood is governed by the following principle:
(P) Vxy (xPy at t iff the region of space occupied by x at t is part of the
region of space occupied by y at t),
i.e. suppose that (P) is an extensionally correct principle about parthood and that it
is indeterminate whether a is part of b, as well as whether b is part of a;83 and (iii)
that this indeterminacy arises because it is not determined which droplets are parts
of b. Now, according to the above definition, a turns out to be vague with respect to
b which conflicts with our intuition that a is not vague with respect to droplets and
larger entities.
2. There is a relatively easy fix for this problem, a fix that should be obvious once
we consider in what settings questions about vagueness arise. These settings are of
two sorts. First, we have cases where some objects are treated as precise and then
83 In Leonard and Goodman's calculus of individuals identity is defined in the following
way:
x = y iff xPy and yPx.
The scenario I am imagining would, therefore, in the Calculus of Individuals entail that
identity was indeterminate. But I don't think that identity can be defined in this way. The
definition is more plausible if we stick a necessary operator in front of the right hand side, i.e.
identity would not be defined in terms of symmetric parthood but in terms of necessary
symmetric parthood. However, I am not sure whether identity should be defined in terms of
parthood at all rather than taken as a primitive.
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we have some other objects whose precision is in question. Examples include
pebbles and mountains, atoms and bodies, droplets and clouds. Second, there are
cases where we have a hierarchy of objects and the ones higher in the hierarchy are
less precise or more vague than those that are lower. A mountain is vague with
respect to a pebble and the pebble is vague with respect to some atom, but, we want
to say, the mountain is more vague than the pebble.
In both kinds of cases it is given that there is a basic level, i.e. a level of objects
whose precision is not in question, though it may vary from case to case what is at
the basic level. The availability of a basic level, whether it is given absolutely or
merely relative to the case in question, that allows us to solve the above problem.
The reason why we say that it is because of the vagueness of the cloud that it is
indeterminate whether this or that fusion of droplets is part of the cloud is that there
is a collection, B, of basic elements, say droplets, such that (i) there is some
subcollection of B such that the fusion of droplets is precise with respect to it, while
the cloud is not, and (ii) there is no subcollection of B with respect to which the
cloud is precise but the fusion of droplets is not. This gives us two additional
conditions for determining vagueness. If there are two objects, a and b, such that it
is indeterminate whether a is part of b and
some subcollection, C, of the basic elements, B, is such that at t,
a is not vague with respect to C but b is,
and,
there is no subcollection, D, of the basic elements, B, such that at t,
b is not vague with respect to D but a is,
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then it is because of the vagueness of b that it is indeterminate whether a is part of b
at t. Adding these two extra conditions to our previous definition of vagueness
gives us what I believe is a satisfactory definition of 'vague object'.
Vague Object: An object O is vague relative to entities E at time t iff
for some x that is one of the Es there are some basic elements B, such that
(1) it is indeterminate whether x is part of O at t, &
(2) 3C (C c B and at t, x is not vague with respect to C and O is vague
with respect to C), &
(3) --,D (D c B and at t, O is not vague with respect to D and x is
vague with respect to D).84
To get a better grip on this definition an example will help. Suppose that
Puffy is a cloud. A consequence of the definition is that although a cloud like Puffy
may be vague it will not be vague with respect to a number of objects, for instance
any droplets that are on the ground and sufficiently far away, and barring vague
identity, no object will be vague with respect to itself. Here vagueness is a relative
property; an object is vague relative to some entities at a certain time. Given a
definition of vagueness, we can define precision as the negation of vagueness.8 5
Then, precision will be relative in the same way as vagueness is.
84 Here the symbol 'c' does not stand for the subset relation but for the subcollection
relation. A collection A is a subcollection of B if anything which is one of the As is one of the
Bs.
85 In Chapter Three in a response to a concern of Russell I said that vagueness, in my case,
contrasted with indeterminacy and not precision. Now I am suggesting that vagueness does
contrast with precision. Do I then fall pray to Russell's charge of a fallacy of vebalism? No,
Russell's notions of vagueness and precision are different from mine. Instead of talking about
precise objects I could talk about sharp objects or determinate objects. In my case vagueness
and precision are defined in terms of determinacy, in Russell's case they are defined in terms
of isomorphism between a system as a representation and a system represented.
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2. Vague constitution
1. I now turn to the problem of material constitution. We want to say that clouds
are made up of or constituted by droplets and that a statue is made up of or
constituted by some clay. To explain what this means is the problem of material
constitution.
First, let's recall why the problem of material constitution is a difficult one. A
statue and the portion of clay it is made of have many properties in common: they
have all the same basic parts, they are in the same location, have the same weight
etc. So, why are they not identical? Well, they can't be identical for three reasons: (i)
the portion of clay existed long before the statue did, (ii) if a small part breaks off the
statue and falls on the floor, the statue becomes a bit smaller but the portion of clay
will be of the same size as before but becomes scattered, and (iii) we might smash
the statue, in which case the clay still exists but the statue is no more. So, the two
can go their separate ways and, therefore, cannot be identical. We seem forced to
conclude that the two are distinct, but somehow intimately related.
In discussing the notion of constitution the natural starting point is Judith
Jarvis Thomson's definition of constitution.8 6 The motivation for Thomson's
definition comes mainly from considerations that fall under reason (ii) above and
we might call 'replacement arguments'. We have a statue on the table at 2 PM, call it
Alfred, and at the same time we have a portion of clay on the table, call it Clay. But
if at a later time a small piece of Alfred is broken off and dropped on the floor, it is
still right to say that Alfred is wholly on the table but the same does not hold for
Clay. Part of Clay is on the floor. So, what we say is that at 2 PM Clay constitutes
86 Judith Thomson, "The statue and the clay", Nois, Vol. 32, No. 2 1998, pp. 149-173.
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Alfred, but after the piece is broken off, Clay does not constitute Alfred although a
proper part of Clay does.
Considerations along these lines suggest that there are parts that are essential
to Clay but not to Alfred and, also, that there are no parts that are essential to Alfred
but not to Clay. This leads Thomson to the following definition:
Thomson's Constitution: x constitutes y at t =df
(1) x is part of y and y is part of x at t, &
(2) x has an essential part that has, at t, no parts essential to y, &
(3) it is not the case that y has an essential part that has, at t, no
parts essential to x.
In this definition 'x' might be replaced by a name of a portion of clay and 'y' might
be replaced by a name of a statue. Alternatively, 'x' might be replaced by a name of
a fusion of some atoms and 'y' might be as before.87
2. How does a definition of constitution along the lines of Judith Thomson fare
when it comes to vague objects? Suppose that a statue is vague with respect to some
atoms. Then there is no fusion of atoms of which it is determinate both that it is part
of the statue and that the statue is part of it. The problem is that if b is vague with
respect to some objects, then for any fusion c of some of those object the sentence "c
constitutes b" will be either indeterminate or false.
In a way this does not at all look like a problem since if an object is vague with
respect to some atoms then it is only to be expected that it is not constituted by any
87 Thomson's definition of material constitution is not immune to challenges not having to
do with vagueness, but I won't go into those matters here. It does get the most important
cases right, i.e. cases where an object such as a statue is constituted by a quantity of matter
and in the case of vagueness, these are also the cases that we need to worry about.
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precise fusion of such atoms. But in another way it does look like a problem since it
squares ill with our intuition that a statue is made of atoms and nothing else, and
that clouds are made of droplets and nothing else, and so on. We want our notion of
constitution to reflect, or at least be consistent with what we mean when we say
such things as: "A cloud is just an aggregate of droplets", or "A cloud is made up of
nothing but droplets". These sentences are supposed to express truths and,
therefore, it would be welcome to have a notion of constitution such that it could be
true of, say, some fusion of droplets that it constituted a cloud. Moreover, once we
are allowing that parthood might be vague it seems natural that this should be
reflected in a notion of constitution that is defined in terms of parthood.
3. Instead of the notion of constitution offered by Judith Thomson I suggest that
wve adopt importantly different notions of partial and exact constitution. When we
say that Puffy is constituted by a fusion of droplets, we don't have any particular
droplets in mind. All we mean is, roughly, that Puffy is made of droplets and the
only building blocks of Puffy are droplets. When we reflect on the vagueness of
Puffy we see that there is no single collection whose fusion is more plausibly the
constituter of Puffy than is an indefinite number of others. 88 This was the
conclusion of the complex problem of the many in Chapter Two. The idea now is
that many fusions might partially constitute Puffy, i.e. instead of constitution being
88 Mark Johnston has suggested that no such fusion is the constituter of Puffy, but rather that
one is its constituter in one precisification and some other in another precisification, and that
this is so because the constitution relation is vague. ("Constitution is not identity", Material
Constitution, M. Rea ed., Rowman and Littlefield, 1997, p. 56.) But it isn't clear that we can
legitimately talk about precisifications in this context. I say more about this in Chapter Six.
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a one-one relation it will be a many-one relation, i.e. for some given object there may
be more than one object that constitutes it.
There are two obvious conditions that any candidate for being a constituter of
Puffy must meet; it must not be deficient, i.e. anything which is determinately part
of Puffy should overlap some part of the constituter and, second, it must not be
excessive, i.e. the constituter must not have a part that is determinately outside
Puffy. So, for instance if an object c constitutes Puffy at t then:
everything which is determinately part of Puffy has a part
that overlaps some part of c at t,
no part of c is determinately not part of Puffy at t.
These conditions serve a similar purpose as condition (1) in Thomsons definition,
namely to guarantee that the constituter and the constitutee are appropriately
bound. My definition of partial constitution then retains the last two clauses of
Thomson's definition. This gives us the following definition of partial constitution.
Partial Constitution: x partially constitutes y at t =df
(1) everything which is determinately part of y has a part that overlaps
some part of x,
(2) no part of x is determinately not part of y at t, &
(3) x has an essential part that has, at t, no parts essential to y, &
(4) it is not the case that y has an essential part that has, at t, no parts
essential to x.
But Partial Constitution is not enough. To say that a water molecule is partially
constituted by two hydrogen atoms and an oxygen atom is not false but somewhat
less than one might want. Any particular water molecule is exactly constituted by
the fusion of some two hydrogen atoms and an oxygen atom. Similarly, a statue will
be exactly constituted by the head, arms, torso and legs although it may be only
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partially constituted by a fusion of atoms. To mark this distinction, we need a
notion of exact constitution in addition to partial constitution.
Given the above notion of partial constitution we might try the following
definition:
x exactly constitutes y at t =df
(1) x partially constitutes y at t, &
(2) for any p that determinately does not overlap any part of x at t,
the fusion of x and p does not partially constitute y at t.
Even if this sounds promising, it does not deliver the goods. Suppose we have five
atoms a1 to a5 and an object b and that (i) it is determinate of a1 to a3 that they are
parts of b at t, (ii) that it is indeterminate of a4 and a5 whether they are parts of b at t,
and (iii) of all objects which do not overlap one of the as it is determinate that they
are not parts of b at t. Then, b is partially constituted by the fusion of {al, a 2, a3, a4,
a5 , but it is also exactly constituted by it. But the idea was that the difference
between partial and exact constitution should track the distinction between
vagueness and precision. In order to fix this we need to add to the definition of
exact constitution the following requirement:
If x exactly constitutes y at t then every part of x is determinately part of y at t.
This gives us the following definition of exact constitution:
Exact Constitution: x exactly constitutes y at t =df
(1) x partially constitutes y at t, &
(2) every part of x is determinately part of y at t, &
(3) for any p that determinately does not overlap any part of x at t, the
fusion of x and p does not partially constitute y at t.
Let's consider the following example to make things clearer. Suppose we have a
statue that is wholly made of atoms and that we can single out a collection of atoms
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such that at t each member of it is determinately part of the statue and everything
which is determinately part of the statue overlaps some of the atoms. Then the
statue is partially constituted by a fusion of some atoms at t. Now, if in addition it is
determinate for any atom whatsoever whether it is part of the statue or not at t then
there is a fusion of some atoms that exactly constitutes the statue at t. But, if there is
but a single atom such that at t, it is indeterminate whether it is part of the statue or
not, then the statue may still be partially constituted by a fusion of some atoms at t
but it won't be exactly constituted by any such fusion.
Now, if Puffy is vague with respect to some droplets it will be partially
constituted by fusions of some droplets but it won't be exactly constituted by the
fusion of any collection of droplets. This has the advantage that we are not forced to
accept, as an unexplainable fact, that some one fusion of droplets constitutes Puffy,
while other fusions, that differ only by a droplet or so, do not constitute a cloud, let
alone Puffy.
4. It is instructive to compare the present notions of partial and exact constitution
and Thomson's notion of constitution. Anything which has a constitution in
Thomson's sense will have an exact constitution, but not the other way around. In
other words, c may exactly constitute b without c constituting b in Thomson's sense.
To see how this can be consider the following example. Let 'b' be a name of a
portion of gas and let 'c' be a name of a fusion (or the fusion if there is only one) of
atoms that make up the gas at some time t. Intuitively, the fusion of the atoms
occupies just the space occupied by the atoms, but if the size of the region of space
occupied by the gas is the volume of the gas then if pressure is around normal
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atmospheric pressure the gas occupies a much larger region. This means that c may
well be part of b, but b cannot be part of c, for we don't want what is part of an object
to be larger than the object itself.
Now, if b is not part of c then b cannot be constituted, in Thomson's sense, by
c. But since the notion of partial constitution only requires that c be part of b and not
also the other way around, and if we can assume that c has an essential part that is
not essential to b while b does not have any essential part that is not essential to c,
then c will partially constitute b. But suppose now that it is quite clear which atoms
are parts of the portion of gas at t. This means that (i) c partially constitutes b at t,
(ii) any part of c is determinately part of b, and (iii) of any atom which does not
overlap some part of c it is determined that the fusion of it and c does not partially
constitutes b at t. But then it follows that c exactly constitutes b at t.
Of course this does not show that Thomson's definition of constitution must
be rejected for one might reject the premiss that the volume of a portion of gas has
much to do with the region of space occupied by the gas or one might say that the
region of space occupied by a fusion of atoms is the region occupied by the portion
of gas that it constitutes. But be that as it may, the example makes clear that my
notion of exact constitution is not equivalent to Thomson's notion of constitution.
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6
Towards a Formal Framework for Vague
Objects
In this chapter I look at some logical properties of a language that has a relation
term, 'is part of', that stands for a vague relation and singular terms referring to
vague objects - for instance the name 'Puffy' and the definite description 'the tallest
mountain in Africa'. In Chapter Three I described the truth conditions of sentences
of the form "aPb" or "-,aPb", now the task is to describe the truth conditions of
complex sentences that have indeterminate sentences as constituents.
We imagine, as a heuristic device, that we begin with a classical language, L,
and then add to this language a parthood predicate, 'P', the extension and the anti-
extension of which are given by the (ND) schema. The resulting language, L p,
resembles a partially interpreted language since there will be pairs of objects that are
neither in the determinate extension nor in the determinate anti-extension of 'P'.
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1. The three valued tables
1. Given a determinate extension and determinate anti-extension for 'P' truth
values for atomic sentences, including negations of atomic sentences, are straight-
forward. There are still unanswered questions about the indeterminate atomic
sentences but these are not about their truth value - they are indeterminate - but
about how to understand this value and what logical properties indeterminate
sentences have.
For a classical bivalent language the classical truth tables tell us how to assign
truth values to complex sentences given an assignment of truth values to atomic
sentences. But once we are in the territory of vagueness, whether it is linguistic or
ontological, the classical tables are inadequate. The simplest idea for assigning truth
values to complex sentences of a vague language, given an assignment for the
atomic sentences, is to use some three valued truth tables. Bui this will not do. A
reason sometimes cited for not using the three valued truth tables is that assignment
of truth values according to them conflicts with classical logic; a sentence of the form
"p v -,p" may be indeterminate according to the three valued tables while it is a
logical truth in classical logic. However, since the logic that the ontological view
demands does not have the law of excluded middle, this reason does not clearly tell
against the three valued tables.
But there is a different problem that makes the three valued tables fail. The
problem is that these tables do not respect what Kit Fine calls 'penumbral
connections' or 'penumbral truths'.8 9 Fine gives an example of a blob whose color is
89 Kit Fine, "Vagueness, truth and logic", Synthese, Vol. 30 1975. The paper is reprinted in
Vagueness: A Reader, R. Keefe and P. Smith eds., MIT Press 1996.
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a borderline case between red and pink. He then argues that there are various
truths that such a blob gives rise to, for instance "The blob is either red or pink" or
"If the blob is red, it isn't pink" or "It is false that the blob is both red and pink".
And for these truths the three valued truth tables can not account. An example of a
penumbral truth that is more relevant in the present context is the following:
Assuming that Sprinkle is on the border of Puffy so that the sentence "Sprinkle is
part of Puffy" is indeterminate, the sentence
If Sprinkle is part of Puffy then Sprinkle is part of Puffy,
ought to be true. However, assuming that Sparky is on the border' of Kilimanjaro,
the sentence
If Sprinkle is part of Puffy then Sparky is part of Kilimanjaro,
ought to be indeterminate. But, as far as the truth tables are concerned, the above
sentences are onl a par.
The problem with the three valued tables is that assignment of truth according
to them presupposes that the truth value of a complex sentence is a function of the
truth values of its constituents. For classical bivalent languages this presupposition
is right, but for vague or partially interpreted languages, it is false.
2. Supervaluation
1. Given that the three valued truth tables fail to describe the distribution of truth
values over complex sentences we might consider supervaluation. Since
supervaluation is just a formal device there is no question that we can use it to
define a predicate, call it 'T', that applies to sentences of L p and behaves in many
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ways like a truth predicate for the language. For instance, by specifying certain
conditions on the acceptable precisifications we can ensure an approximate fit
between some intuitive notion of truth and our new predicate. Where 'S' is an
atomic sentence we can guarantee that the following conditionals hold.
If 'S' is determinately true in Lp, then T(S),
if 'S' is determinately false in Lp, then not-T(S),
if 'S' is neither determinately true nor determinately false in Lp,
then neither T(S) nor not-T(S).
Moreover, 'T' will apply to many complex sentences just in case they are true, for
instance any sentence of the form 'p - p'. The question now is whether our new
predicate 'T' is properly called a truth predicate for L p.
Supervaluation fits well into the linguistic account of vagueness but our
concern is ontological vagueness and not linguistic. And that makes some
difference. Combining the ontological view about vagueness and the linguistic
notion of precisification does not automatically give us an account of truth
conditions of complex sentences where one or more constituent is vague. In the
ontological view there is no obvious way to understand the notion of precisification
that lends itself to a supervaluation definition of truth or satisfaction. To get a better
grip on this problem, consider the following suggestion by Mark Johnston. He
argues that the problem of the many shows that constitution is a vague relation and,
having come to that conclusion, he says:
Our cloud c is not only not identical with any one of the ko0, k1, k2, [which are
aggregates of droplets] but also it is not definitely constituted by any one of the ko,
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kl, k2, ... Rather, on one legitimate sharpening it is constituted by one of the ks, on
another, another of the ks, and so on.90
I agree with Johnston that the problem of the many shows that constitution is a
vague relation, but what he says about sharpenings I do not find helpful. I actually
think that it is confused. What is it that is being sharpened, or precisified as I prefer
to say? Is it the cloud? If it is the cloud we need to know what a precisification of a
cloud is. Or is it perhaps the constitution relation that has precisifications or the
relation term 'constitutes'? Johnston does not tell us.91
2. One way of understanding the notion of a precisification in the context of
vague objects is this: To precisify a vague object is to change the status of its
borderline parts so that they become either determinate parts or determinate non-
parts of the object. This is a clear notion of a precisification, and it is the notion that
Michael Tye has in mind when he says:
90 Mark Johnston, "Constitution is no/ identity", reprinted in Material Constitution, M. Rea
ed., Rowman and Littlefield, 1997, p. 56.
91 E.J. Lowe suggests a solution to the problem of the many that is similar to Johnston's. He
says that "... we can say that it is neither determinately true nor determinately false that it is c,
as opposed to c1 or c153 or some other c,, that constitutes Tibbles at present - though it is
determinately true that just one of them does, because whichever candidate were chosen as
occupying the role of constituter of Tibbles would exclude all others from the role". ("The
problem of the many and the vagueness of constitution", Analysis, Vol. 55, No. 3 1995, p. 180).
What does it mean to say that such and such would be the case if this or that candidate where
chosen to be the constituter of Tibbles? Is Lowe suggesting that it is up to people to choose
which are the parts of Tibbles? It may be up to people to choose which are the parts of certain
objects, for instance, in 1944 the people of Iceland decided by a public vote that Iceland
should not be part of Denmark. But in the case of Tibbles I don't think the notion of a choice
has any role, at least not if vagueness is to be explained in ontological rather than linguistic
terms.
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[The view that a vague object is one that is capable of being made more precise]
has certain plausibility for the case of concrete objects such as Everest. For it is not
difficult to imagine circumstances in which Everest is made more precise.
Suppose, for example, that extremely powerful bombs are detonated around the
base of Everest and that as a result of the explosions Everest's base is much more
clearly defined than before. In these circumstances, Everest has fewer indefinite
spatio-temporal parts. So Everest is more precise. 92
Obviousiy, the kind of precisification that Tye talks about is not helpful for
specifying the truth conditions of complex sentences.9 3 When we want to say why
the sentence "If Sparky is part of Kilimanjaro then Sparky is part of Kilimanjaro" is
true we don't have to imagine what would be true if Kilimanjaro would be made
more precise by one or another way of dropping bombs around its base.
A less dramatic idea of precisification for vague objects is this: A precisifica-
tion of a vague object, say Kilimanjaro, is a precise object, K, that overlaps
Kilimanjaro in such a way that everything that is determinately part of Kilimanjaro
is part of K and everything that is determinately not part of Kilimanjaro is not part
of K. The set of all acceptable precisifications will be the set of all the precise objects
that satisfy these two conditions. This is closer to the idea that Johnston seemed to
have in mind, and it is also closer to the linguistic notion since, according to this
idea, one does not have to do anything to the vague object when giving a
precisification of it. But on this account, a precisification of Kilimanjaro is an object
that is distinct from Kilimanjaro both numerically and qualitatively. And why
92 Michael Tye, "Vague Objects", p. 538.
93 Tye does not think that this idea of precisification is helpful in giving the truth conditions
of complex sentences. I borrow Tye's example here because he, unlike Johnston I'm afraid,
has a clear idea of what a precisification of a vague object might be.
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should truths about Kilimanjaro be determined by truths about these different
objects.
Johnston does not explain why truths about Kilimanjaro should depend on
truths about all the different precisifications and although that, by itself, does not
show that no such explanation is available, we have independent reason to believe
that it isn't. In the case of supervaluation over precisification of objects instead of
words what we get is not a definition of truth in terms of truth in all precisifications
but a definition of satisfaction in terms of satisfaction by all precisifications.
Satisfaction w.r.t. precisification: A vague object satisfies an open sentence just
in case every acceptable precisification of the object satisfies the same open
sentence.
Now, since each of the precisifications of Kilimanjaro is precise, they all satisfy the
open sentences:
There is some set that is the set of all and only the atoms
that are parts of
is precise.
has no borderline parts.
And since each of the precisifications satisfies these open sentences, by our
definition of satisfaction so does Kilimanjaro. But if vagueness is to be explained by
a feature of Kilimanjaro itself, namely that it is a vague object, then Kilimanjaro




since otherwise we would still have the problem of the many But then it follows by
the above definition of satisfaction that Kilimanjaro does not satisfy it, i.e. it follows
that Kilimanjaro is not a mountain. And that is not right.
The question why truths about Kilimanjaro should be determined by truths
about all the different precisifications is analogous to a question sometimes asked
about the linguistic view: Why should truth for English be defined in terms of truth
for a class of different languages?9 4 The thought behind this question is that the
different precisifications are different languages and although these different
language resemble English in some important respects it is not clear that truth in
English should be defined in terms of truth in these other languages. After all, these
other languages also differ from English in important respects. But this thought is
mistaken. Different acceptable precisifications are not different languages, they are
different models of English. The idea behind supervaluation can be put like this: A
sentence in English is true if and only if it is true in all acceptable models of English.
It is still a non trivial question why a sentence in a vague language should be
regarded true just in case it is true in all acceptable models of the language, and it is
a still further question why these models should be classical. But, whatever attitude
we take towards these questions we might notice that on the idea of precisification
that Johnston seems to have in mind, no comparable questions arise. The
precisifications in Johnston's story are not different models, classical or otherwise,
they are just different objects.
94 Vann McGee and Brian McLaughlin discuss this question in an appendix to "Distinction
without a difference" ("Appendix: Answer to a question of Sanford", Southern Journal of
Philosophy, Supplement, Vol. 33, pp. 239-242).
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3. I don't think there is any way of applying the notion of precisification to
material objects for the purpose of giving truth conditions of complex sentences.
However, this alone does not show that supervaluation will not be of help. If the
parthood relation is vague, then a predicate 'P' that respects this vagueness will also
be vague, i.e. there will be objects, say Sparky and Kilimanjaro, such that
"(Sparky)P(Kilimanjaro)" will be neither true nor false. Now, someone might
suggest that although vagueness is being explained in ontological terms, we focus
on language when it comes to describe truth conditions of complex sentences; we
precisify the predicate and use supervaluation to describe the truth conditions of
complex sentences just the way friends of the linguistic view do. Can we do this? I
don't think there is any straightforward answer to this question. As I mentioned
before, we can use supervatuation to define a predicate 'T' that resembles at truth
predicate in many ways. But assuming that we have the predicate 'T' defined in
terms of supervaluation over precisifications of the predicate 'P', we might ask:
According to what conception of truth would 'T' actually be a truth predicate of Lp?
The conception of truth could hardly be a correspondence conception since, in
defining the acceptable precisifications, we have explicitly ignored what the
language is about and focused our attention just on the language itself.
3. A mixed batch
1. Our task is to explain how the truth values of complex sentences, whether
'true', 'false' or 'indeterminate', derive from the truth values of atomic sentences.
We have seen that the three valued truth tables are not helpful, and although the
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conclusion is not as straight forward in the case of supervaluation, there seems to be
no clear way of defining a notion of a precisification that respects the intention that
the vagueness is ontological while lending itself to a supervaluation definition of
truth or satisfaction. How can we then explain how truth values of complex
sentences derive from truth values of atomic sentences?
Let's attend to certain features of how the predicate 'P' is introduced, i.e. how
we get from L to Lp. First, the extension and the anti-extension of 'P' are given by
the (ND) schema and the (ND) schema treats a negation of an atomic sentence about
parthood as itself atomic. In other words, the truth of a sentence of the form "--aPb"
is determined in a way analogous to the way in which the truth of a sentence of the
form "aPb" is determined. This means that negation should not be treated as a one
place logical connective. Second, truth of an atomic sentence about parthood,
whether it has the negation sign or not, amounts to provability; i.e. such a sentence
is true just in case it is derivable in the sense of the (ND) schema. In this respect, the
notion of truth is similar to the intuitionistic notion of truth. But similarities with
the intuitionistic notion do not cut deep since the notion of derivability in the case of
the (ND) schema is more robust than the intuitionistic notion. Third, there are
general sentences that are true independently of a derivation of their instances.
These general sentences are treated as meaning postulates. This last condition opens
up the possibility that truth is not compositional, a disjunction, for instance, might
be true (derivable) without any of the disjuncts being true (derivable) simply by
being an instance of a disjunctive meaning postulate.
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2. We assume that L contains sentences describing the primitive facts on which
facts about parthood depend. Then we add to this language some general principles
about parthood, for instance the principle that parthood is transitive, that if an atom
is caught up in the physiological processes that make up a living organism then the
atom is part of that organism, and so on. These are the general principles that figure
in the (ND) schema. We call the resulting language Lo. But no singular sentences
about parthood are true in Lo0, i.e. the extension and the anti-extension of 'P' are
empty. At the next stage, L1, sentences about parthood that are derivable from the
primitive facts along with the general principles about parthood are determined, for
instance at L1 the sentence "Tibbles' fur is part of Tibbles" is true. At the next stage,
L2, this fact along with the principle about the transitivity of parthood determines
(H),
(H) If Harry is part of Tibbles.' fur then Harry is part of Tibbles.
We say that some facts about parthood are immediately settled by the primitive
facts, others are settled by the ;1 rimitive facts plus facts about parthood that are
immediately settled, and so on. The set of true sentences of L we call Fl. The set of
true sentences of L0o we call Flo and so on. There will be certain sentences of the form
"aPb" that are determined true or false when the premisses are restricted to the set
F 0. This expands the set of true sentences, we call the expanded set -1l. The
monotonicity of the (ND) schema guarantees that the new set rI1 does not alter the
truth value of any sentence that has already been classified as either true or false, i.e.
lo c ll. Once we have n11 instead of no there are more resources to make sentences
about parthood either true or false, so that we reach a new set of true sentences, FI2.
We can imagine repeating the process indefinitely. If at some stage we reach a level
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where I,, = n,,l we call Fl, a fixed point. We call the set of sentences true at a fixed
point nf and this is the set of true sentences of Lp. At a fixed point the predicate 'P'
has an extension and an anti-extension but if parthood is vague then the one is not
the compliment of the other.
This framework gives us two notions of truth. A relative notion of truth at a
stage, and an absolute notion of truth at a fixed point. The intuitive notion of truth
in English corresponds to the absolute notion of truth, i.e. 'true in English' will
correspond to 'true at a fixed point'. The question whether the framework offers a
satisfying account of truth for a language depends on two things. First, whether the
process ever reaches a fixed point, and second, what properties the fixed point has.
The first question is easily answered. From the monotonicity of the (ND) schema -
and the assumption that sentences about parthood form a set, it follows that the
process does have a fixed point.95 The second question is more difficult, I am not
even sure that it has any clear answer.
3. We assume that the distribution of truth values over sentences not containing
the parthood predicate is as we would intuitively expect. We should notice,
however, that the underlying logic does not have the law of excluded middle. The
task now is to describe the truth conditions of complex sentences composed of
sentences that are indeterminate. We have already seen how one such sentences is
treated, namely
95 See Kripke's "Outline of a theory of Truth", p. 704. That there is a fixed point also follows
if we treat the (ND) schema as a normal default theory, i.e. it is a theorem that any normal
default theory has an extension.
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If Harry is part of Tibbles' fur then Harry is part of Tibbles.
What allows us to get the truth value of (H) right is that at the bottom level we
adopt the required meaning postulates; in the case of (H) the principle that parthood
is transitive. Once it is determined that Tibbles' fur is part of Tibbles, the transitivity
of parthood allows us to derive (H). But what about
If Harry is part of Tibbles then Harry is part of Tibbles.
Here, the transitivity of parthood is not going to help. What we need is a definition
of '--'.
Intuitively, any sentence of the form "p -- p" ought to be true, no matter what
the truth value of p is. This makes two things clear, first that '--' can not be defined
in terms of the standard truth table, or the three valued tables, second, that "p -- y"
is not equivalent to "p v -,p" since we allow that the latter be indeterminate when p
is indeterminate. But given our notion of truth as provability, there is an intuitive
way of defining '-'. We say that a sentence of the form 'p -- q' is true just in case q
is derivable from p, in symbols
pq-) iffp Fq.
More specifically, we can say that a sentence of the form "p -- q" is true at a fixed
point just in case q follows from the union of nf and (p}, in symbols
nf p - q iff ilfu {p  q,
where n1f is the set of sentences true at a fixed point.
4. As I mentioned above a negation of an atomic sentence of the form "aPb" is
itself an atomic sentence and this complicates things somewhat. The problem is that
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(H)
when negation is applied to an atomic sentence about parthood the complexity of
the sentence does not increase but when negation is applied to a complex sentence
the complexity of the sentence does increase. The question that we need to answer
is: What are the logical properties of negation? From the logic governing the (ND)
schema it follows that negation has some familiar properties, for instance that a
sentence and its negation can never be true at the same time,
not p A-p.
But what shall we say about sentences of the form "-,(p v q)" or "--,(p A q)". One way
to give the truth conditions of negations of complex sentences is to use De Morgan's
law and give the truth conditions in terms of negated atomic sentences.
-(p v q) .P -p --,q,
-(p A q) -p v -q
The question then becomes how to define conjunction and disjunction.
5. Before I consider how we might define conjunction and disjunction I want to
consider one more example of a penumbral truth about parthood. Supposing that A
is a place on the border of the United States and Canada, the sentence
(2) Either A is part of the United States or A is part of Canada
should be true. But can we make sense of this sentence's being true in the present
framework? As long as we can assume, at the bottom level, the general principles
that there is no unclaimed space between adjacent countries the above sentence
should come out true. In other words, as long as we can assume at the bottom level
the following principle:
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(B) If A is a place on the border of two countries then it is part of
one of those countries,
then sentence (2) will come out true. It follows from (B) and the assumption that A
is on the border of the United States and Canada. This has some interesting
consequences. Since (2) is derivable at some stage, it is true, and yet neither disjunct
is derivable at any stage, i.e. neither disjunct is true.
This situation is somewhat peculiar. The feature that is responsible for the
provability of a disjunction without either disjunct being provable, is that the
general principle that is involved is about entities that depend on each other. Which
places belong to Canada depends partially on which places belong to the States, and
vice versa. By contrast, living beings, such as cats and people, are not like this, i.e.
what parts the cat Tibbles has does not depend on what parts some other entity,
which is not part of the cat, has. Mountains and lakes are, perhaps, somewhere in-
between as are parts of animals.
6. One explanation of this interdependence of countries is to consider countries
as human constructs and principle (B) as a defining principle for countries.9 6 If we
suppose that countries are human constructs, what our definition of disjunction will
look like depends, in part, on what principles govern such constructs. Friends of
96 Interdependence of objects can not, in general, be explained by reference to human
constructs. Among interdependent objects are parts of animals; Tibbles' head and nect are
distinct objects but wehre one ends depends on where the other begins, and I don't want to
explain this interdependence by saying the the head and the neck are human constructs. The
reason why I mention the thesis that countries are human constructs is simply that it lends
itself well to my present purposes, in particular, assuming that countries are human
constructs we can, in an intuitive way, give the truth conditions of complex sentences about
countries by supervaluation in a way analogous to the way friends of the linguistic theory
give truth conditions of such sentences.
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constructivism in mathematics usually ascribe to intuitionistic logic, according to
which a disjunction is true just in case at least one of the disjuncts is true. But it is
not clear that what is appropriate in the context of constructivism in mathematics is
also appropriate for other kinds of constructed entities such as countries. All that is
needed in order for there to be a disjunction that is true while neither disjunct is true
is that there be a principle like (B) above that is among the defining principles for
countries. And assuming that countries are human constructs I don't see why (B)
might not be such a principle. More generally, if the constructs are not constructed
one at a time but in pairs or bunches, then I don't see any reason why this should
not give rise to a disjunction being true about a pair or a bunch of objects without
there being some one thing of which it is true. And if that is right, then intuitionistic
logic will not do justice to the logical properties of a language that is about such
objects.
However, although supervaluation over precisifications of material objects is
doubtful, there is a way in which supervaluation might be used to account for truths
about constructs such as countries. The idea would be that the constructed objects
are incomplete in some respects; their properties depend on people's decisions and
deeds but these might not fix, for instance, whether a certain place belongs to the
United States or to Canada, although they might fix that it belongs to one or the
other. What is true about a construct would then be defined in terms of what would
be true on any way of completing the construction. The slogan might be: Vagueness
is ontological indecision. This might open the possibility to use supervaluation to
define satisfaction, but the appropriate notion of supervaluation will be different
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from the linguistic notion since it will not be defined over a class of precisifications
but over a class of completions.
In the case of supervaluation over completions we define satisfaction in the
following way:
Satisfaction w.r.t. completion: An object O satisfies an open sentence just in
case every acceptable completion of O would satisfy 0.
In this definition '' is not restricted to what we might call atomic contexts, i.e. '' is
not restricted to contexts suci. as
is part of Canada,
but could also stand for contexts such as
is part of Canada or is not part of Canada,
is part of Canada or is part of the United States.
Satisfaction in a model M of the language Lp is defined with respect to a class of
models whose domain is different from the domain of M. We call them 'acceptable
completions of M'. If Mc is an acceptable completion of M then for any incomplete
object O in M there is a different object Oc in Mc such that 0 c is an acceptable
completion of 0. Now we can think of the acceptable completions as possible
worlds and the relation 'is an acceptable completion of' as analogous o the
counterpart or trans world identity relation in modal logic. We can then interpret
the '0' in modal logic as 'it is determinate that'. We say that it is determinate that a
is part of b just in case it is true in all acceptable completions that a is part of the
completion of b. But notice that the accessibility relation, i.e. the relation which
determines which worlds are accessible from which worlds is quite restrictive. Two
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worlds (i.e. two completions) may be accessible from the actual world but they wont
be accessible from one another.
7. Rather than consider countries as incomplete human constructs, we might
concede a little to the linguistic view and accept the claim that names such as
'United States' and 'Canada' are vague. Now, if the vagueness of the sentence
"Place A is part of Canada" is explained by semantic indecision, truth for complex
sentences, with this sentence as a constituent, will be given in terms of
supervaluation over acceptable precisifications of the name 'Canada'.
But can we concede to the linguistic view that, in some cases, vagueness is due
to semantic indecision while maintaining that, in other cases, vagueness is due to
the way objects themselves are? The answer depends on whether we can
distinguish these cases in some systematic way. I think we can. There is an
important disanalogy between names of, say, countries on the one hand, and proper
names of people and other living beings, on the other. Notice that what the
reference of the name 'United States' is depends, in part, on what the reference of
the name 'Canada' is, but in the case of proper names of people and cats we don't
have such interdependence.
8. The situation is now like this. Indeterminacy of sentences such as
Sparky is part of Kilimanjaro
Specky is part of Toni Morrison
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has to be explained in ontological terms; these sentences are vague because
Kilimanjaro and Toni Morrison are vague objects. But there are other indeterminate
sentences, such as
Place A is part of Canada,
where we have a choice between an ontological explanation and a linguistic
explanation. According to either explanation the source of the vagueness is
indecision, ontological indecision if the explanation is ontological, semantic
indecision if the explanation is linguistic. And either explanation lends itself to
supervaluation.
In an evaluation, whether it is a precisification or a completion, we can define
disjunction and conjunction by the three valued truth tables and '--' by " p -- q iff
p q", and then use supervaluation to define the corresponding connectives for Lp.
But what about the quantifiers? We can define the existential quantifier in terms of
disjunction, but defining universal quantification will not be as straight forward.
Since in our framework truth amounts to provability, a universal generalization
ought to be true just in case it is provable. As long as we are dealing with only finite
domain this is fine; we can name all the members of the domain and then say that a
universal generalization is provable just in case every instance of it is provable. But
once we allow that the domain of discourse is infinite the simple equivalence
between the provability of a universal generalization and the provability of all its
instances does not hold. The problem is that we might run out of names so that
although we prove all the instances we do not thereby prove the universal
generalization itself.
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To make the problem clearer, suppose we have an infinite domain and three
names, a, b and c. Now, we might be able to prove "Fa A Fb A Fc" but that is no
prove of "Vx Fx". Even having infinitely many names does not suffice for a proof of
all instances of a universal generalization being a proof of the generalization itself.
Suppose we run a hotel with infinitely many rooms and that we have one guest in
each room. Imagine that the we have an infinite list of names, 'Tom', 'Dick', 'Harry'
... such that substituting each of these for 'x' in "x has ordered breakfast" makes a
true sentence. Does this mean that the sentence "all the guests ordered breakfast" is
true? No, for instance the guest in room 13 might not have a name at all. What is
needed in order for a prove of all instances of a generalization amounting to a proof
of the generalization itself is that the model is covered, i.e. that every object in the
domain has a name.
The assumption that every object has a name is not a plausible assumption for
a natural language if the domain is very large, let alone infinite. But at this point we
can turn to mathematics. We can imagine a mathematical function that assigns a
name to every object in the domain. These names should not be understood as
names in a natural language, since, first, we will not be able to know what the
reference of each name is and, second, each name is by definition precise. Let n l, n2,
n3 ... be such names. Now we can imagine adding the infinite list of names, nl, n2, n3
... , to Lp, we call the resulting language LN, and then define a universal
generalization in the following way: A universal generalization is true in Lp iff
every instance of it is true in LN, or in symbols:
FLp Vx Fx iff LN Fnl A Fn2 A Fn3 ...
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were "Fn1 A Fn 2 A Fn 3 ..." is an infinite conjunction where each name on the list n1,
n2, n3 ... appears following an instance of the predicate symbol 'F'.
9. Whether the names 'United States' and 'Canada' are vague names referring to
precise objects or precise names referring to vague objects, truth conditions for
complex sentences can be given by supervaluation over evaluations. In either case
in an evaluation the logical connectives are defined in the following way:
p v q iff porq.
p A q iff p and q.
F-p-- q iff p q.
Negation of an atomic sentence will be treated as an atomic sentence and negation
of disjunction or conjunction will be defined by De Morgan's law and the above
definitions of disjunction and conjunction. But the acceptable evaluations will not
be classical models, since in any such model there will be sentences that are neither
true nor false, for instance the sentence "Sparky is part of Kilimanjaro" or "Specky is
part of Toni Morrison" where Specky is a borderline case of an atom that is part of
Toni Morrison. This means that the law of excluded middle will not be valid, i.e. Lp




On the previous pages I have offered an account of the ontological view, I have
distinguished it from two alternatives, the epistemic view and the linguistic view,
and I have argued that the ontological view has some advantages over these
alternatives. But the ontological view does not come for free and deciding whether
to accept it or not will be a matter of balancing the advantages against the cost. So,
what are the advantages and what is the cost?
The main advantage of the ontological view is that it offers a solution to the
problem of the many without running into the problem of vague reference and the
problem of de re beliefs, i.e. the following three propositions are true according to the
ontological view:
(1) There are ordinary material objects.
(2) Ordinary names in our language have determinate reference.
(3) We can have de re beliefs about ordinary material objects.
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On the alternative views at least one of the above propositions is false. Along the
way I have mentioned some cost:
(4) We have to give up the law of excluded middle. (Chapter Two,
section 2)
(5) We have to accept kinds. (Chapter Four, section 2)
(6) We have to accept the thesis that objects have natures. (Chapter
Four, section 2)
(7) We have to give non-standard semantics for the logical connectives.
(Chapter Six, section 3).
In addition to these costs, one should bear in mind that the ontological view, as I
have laid it out, offers only a limited solution to problems of vagueness; it has little
or nothing to say about the sorites paradox and the Ship of Theseus. Now two
questions arise: First, should we accept a limited solution to problems of
vagueness? Second, is the cost of the ontological view too high?
I shall begin addressing the first question. I accept, as a general maxim, that
similar problems should have similar solution. For instance, insofar as the liar
paradox and Russell's paradox are similar problems they should receive similar
solutions. But, as I mentioned in the introduction, I don't think that all problems of
vagueness have more in common than the name, in particular, I don't think that the
problem of the many, on the one hand, and the sorites paradox and the Ship of
Theseus, on the other, are similar problems. If this is right then the fact that the
ontological view offers only a limited solution doesn't count against it.
But is the cost of the ontological view too hight? Any solution to the problem
of the many that I know of is costly, and there isn't going to be any neutral
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standpoint from which we can balance the cost against the benefits. So, rather than
asking which view is least costly, we should ask whether there is any attractive
standpoint from which the benefits of the ontological view are worth the cost. It is
obvious from the above list of what the cost of the ontological view is that such a
standpoint is unattractive by, for instance, Quine's lights, if only for the fact that it is
revisionary about logic. But I think there is an attractive standpoint from which the
benefits of the ontological view outrun the cost; it is a broadly Aristotelian
standpoint and it is non-revisionary about ordinary objects.
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